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Foreword  
 
The topic of  Latino Politics in this study requires explanation of its most 
significant terms in advance. To adequately understand how comprehensive this 
subject is it is essential to discuss meanings and use of the terms  Latino and 
Hispanic. 
The term  Hispanic was first used by immigrants from Latin America in the 
nineteenth century, to emphasize their pride and heritage.
1 In  the 1970s the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census adopted this term, making it the official designator for 
people of Latin American and Spanish descent living in the United States.  “The 
federal government defines  Hispanic or  Latino as a person of Mexican, Puerto 
Rican, Cuban, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin 
regardless of race. Thus, Hispanics may be of any race.”
2 In that way the Spanish-
speaking minority was supposed to be separated from other minorities such as 
African Americans or Asians.  
The term  Latino first appeared during the 1980s and was generally used by the 
Spanish-speaking population as an “unofficial” term to emphasize its heritage 
from Latin America. It was primarily used by people living in urban areas such as 
Los Angeles, New York City, and Chicago where there are now significant 
numbers of people from various Latin American nations.  
In fact, ‘Latino’ is simply a truncated form of a nineteenth-
century romantic nationalist idea that has its origins in the 
French Second Empire of Napoleon III. The phrase ‘Latin 
America’ has been traced to an 1856 speech by the Chilean 
author Francisco Bilbao and around the same time (and 
apparently independently) an essay by the Uruguayan José 
María Torres Caicedo, both of whom were then in  exile in 
Paris.
3 
 
Officially, the term  Latino appeared for the first time on the census form of 2000. 
Yet, the vast majority of Latinos probably knows little or nothing of the terms’ 
origin and uses it only because it dislikes the term Hispanic, widely considered to 
be the government’s description. Both terms, however, are meant to describe the 
                                                 
1 See: Dávila, Arlene: Latinos Inc., University of California, Berkeley, 2001; 15. 
2 Ramirez, Roberto R.: We the people: Hispanics in the United States, U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/censr-18.pdf, 2004; 1. 
3 Fox, Geoffrey: Hispanic Nation-Culture, Politics, and the Constructing of Identity, University of 
Arizona Press, Tucson, 1996; 13.                                                                                                                  
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same people. Latinos account for more than 40 million people who trace their 
roots to the Spanish-speaking regions of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Given this extensive diversity, the use of terms such as Latino or Hispanic offers 
the possibility to draw a much simpler picture of who these persons are. “Rather 
than examine and assess each national-origin group in terms of ‘its own political 
needs and status,’ it converts them from a diverse and complex mix of groups to a 
simplified and a more manageable package of a new ‘ethnic group’.”
  4 This not 
only helps policymakers and demographers to deal with complex political issues, 
but also makes it easier for the society as a whole to arrange its components. 
Both terms fail to adequately reflect the richness of racial identity of the people 
from more than twenty countries; a logical consequence when it comes to the 
classification of a population.  
It is important to note that ethnic labels, like all names, are 
by their very nature abstractions of a reality  – in many 
ways, a necessity of speech in a society as large and 
complex as the United States. As such, their usage perhaps 
inevitably includes singling out particular socially 
constructed attributes, whether related to race, gender, 
class, or language.
5 
 
However, both terms are used in academic discourse  and will be used 
interchangeably in this work. Whenever one of the terms comes up it refers to all 
individuals originally from a Spanish-speaking country of Latin America or the 
Caribbean. In this context the actual language proficiency of the individual is 
unimportant. When going into more detail describing different groups under the 
broader ethnic labels  Latino/Hispanic, the more specific terms Mexican 
American, Cuban American, and Puerto Rican will be used.  
The term  Latino Politics is used as Kim Geron does in his book Latino Political 
Power. It refers “to the broad array of efforts by Latinos in politics, whether they 
are joint efforts by several national-origin groups working together in one group 
or political activity or the efforts simply of one national-origin group.”
6 This 
includes voting as well as non-electoral activities such as supporting publicly 
organized initiatives or actively engaging in community organizations. 
                                                 
4 García, John A.: Latino Politics in America – Community, Culture, and Interests, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, 2003; 5. 
5 Oboler, Suzanne: Ethnic Labels, Latino Lives – Identity and the Politics of (Re)Presentation in 
the United States, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1995; XV. 
6 Geron, Kim: Latino Political Power, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2005; 3.                                                                                                                  
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The study at hand is predominantly based upon four sources that have no direct 
connection to each other. The book  Latino Political Power by Kim Geron 
constitutes the most important  – and concurrently  – the most up-to-date source. 
Geron offers an overview of the development of Latino Politics beginning with 
Mexico’s independence from Spain in 1821. It served as a model for the 
composition of the study and provided basic knowledge. Geron works as 
Assistant Professor at California State University, East Bay in the political science 
department. His research interests embrace race and ethnic politics as well as 
immigration policy. 
Latino Politics in America – Community, Culture, and Interests by John A. García 
identifies prerequisites that are essential for Latino political participation. 
Particularly, it addresses the dichotomy of diversity and similarity among Latinos. 
García argues that Latinos do represent a political community to a certain extent, 
but  that their complexity must not be disregarded. John A. García is professor in 
the department of political science at the University of Arizona. Much of his 
research efforts have concentrated upon the Mexican origin community and other 
Latino groups, in relation to political community, mobilization and participation, 
political behaviors, and local politics. García is a member of the American 
Political Science Association (APSA). 
Geoffrey Fox’s book Hispanic Nation – Culture, Politics, and the Constructing of  
Identity, provides an insight in Latino diversity. It rejects the model of a common  
Latino agenda and the composition of a Latino Nation within the United States. 
Fox refers to the complexity of Latinos and argues that these people only use the 
labels Latino and Hispanic to find their place within U.S. society. Geoffrey Fox is 
a freelance writer, editor and translator specializing in Latin American culture and 
politics. He published several books and articles about Latin America and Latinos 
in the United States. 
Lastly, reports and studies by the  Pew Hispanic Center provided up-to-date 
numbers of Latino demographics and election results. They serve as important 
indicators of recent developments and outline upcoming political, economic, and 
cultural trends. The Pew Hispanic Center is a nonpartisan nonprofit research 
organization , and therefore does not advocate for or take positions on policy 
issues. It is a project of the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan “think tank” in                                                                                                                  
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Washington, DC. All research and  publications are freely accessible via the 
center’s homepage. 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
A June 13
th 2003 press release by the Census Bureau officially confirmed what 
many observers long had predicted: Latinos in the United States had become the 
biggest minority passing African Americans by increasing from 35.3 million on 
April 1, 2000, to 38.8 million on July 1, 2002.
7 In 2004 the total Latino population 
increased to 41.3 million.
8 The two main reasons for this growth are high birth 
rates and large-scale immigration from Latin America, mainly Mexico. A 
substantial share of the growth of the Latino population is due to illegal 
immigration. Demographers estimate that around 10 million undocumented 
immigrants live in the United States. “Roughly 60% are believed to  come from 
Mexico and another 20% from the rest of Latin America, bringing the Hispanic 
share of that total to 80%, or 8 million.”
9 
In December 2005, given these numbers, Republican senators pushed for a law in 
the U.S. Congress that would make illegal immigration a crime and even punish 
people who help illegal aliens. Thus, doctors, nurses, and social workers, as well 
as other professionals who might help illegal immigrants, would be penalized. 
This bill, for the first time in U.S. history, caused widespread opposition by 
Latinos. Throughout the country, millions of Latino citizens and illegal 
immigrants took to the streets in cities like Los Angeles and New York City to 
protest the legislation. Although Latinos of Mexican descent comprised the vast 
majority, protests were supported by all Latino national-origin groups, as well as 
Asian and African Americans.  
                                                 
7 U.S. Census Bureau: Hispanic Population Reaches All-Time High of 38.8 Million, New Census 
Bureau Estimates Show, http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/hispanic_origin_population/001130.html, 2003. 
8 U.S. Census Bureau: Hispanic Population passes 40 million, Census Bureau Reports, 
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/005164.html, 2005. 
9 Pew Hispanic Center: Hispanics-A People in Motion,  
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/40.pdf; 2.                                                                                                                  
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The proposed law by Republican Senators was driven by the public concern 
toward Latinos which has come about as Latinos grow in number and influence. 
Unwillingness to fully integrate and therefore dilute the American core culture are 
well-established objections by critics of the growing Latino population. One of 
the most well known critics is Harvard Professor Samuel P. Huntington who only 
recently published his book “Who are We”, discussing the impact other 
civilizations and their values have on America’s culture. Huntington in particular 
points out the Latino population which he considers as a threat to America’s core 
values and identity due to the numbers and common Spanish language.  
This perception, however, misses one fundamental point: what is called the Latino 
population in the United States is far from being a uniform entity. Consisting of 
more than twenty nationalities with different economic and legal premises, 
Latinos are highly heterogeneous. The study at hand will research how this 
heterogeneity outcrops and which factors thereto contribute using the example of 
Latino political engagement in the United States. Mexican Americans, Cuban 
Americans, and Puerto Ricans  – the three largest Latino national-origin groups  – 
will serve as examples. 
Speaking Spanish is one attribute used to differentiate Latinos from other groups, 
even though especially second and later generation Latinos tend to be English 
dominant. A similar misperception concerns skin color of Latinos who are white, 
brown, and black; thus racially constituting an incredibly diverse minority.  
Popular (mis) conceptions about […] specific 
characteristics attributed to a particular group often serve to 
explain a particular ethnic label and to justify 
differentiating the group from others in the society. In the 
process the obvious diversity of individual people’s lives, 
social experiences, and political beliefs are set aside.
10   
 
Growing attention is given to the Latino population by media and academics due 
to its rapid growth and the subsequent increasing influence. However, public 
discourse often fails to make clear why one talks of one minority when persons 
whose ancestry is tied to Mexico  are associated with persons whose ancestry is 
connected to Puerto Rico. Postcolonial history and culture of these two countries 
– despite some parallels  – have been substantially diverse from each other, thus 
shaping their population differently. Both countries obviously share Spanish as 
                                                 
10 Oboler, xvi.                                                                                                                  
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the official language but when it comes to their political and social situation 
within the United States, significant differences abound.  
Whereas Puerto Ricans hold U.S. citizenship by birth, thus being able to legally 
enter the United States and live there, Mexicans do not, and as mentioned before, 
account for about 60% of illegal immigrants. Additionally, significant differences 
exist in the economic situation of national-origin groups belonging to what is 
called the Latino population. Cuban Americans are widely considered to be well 
educated and economically middle-class when they enter the United States. 
Furthermore, their political views are mostly different from Mexican Americans 
or Puerto Ricans. Since many Cuban Americans left their island for political 
reasons, they tend to support the Republican Party, long considered to take a 
tougher stand toward Fidel Castro and his socialist regime than the Democrats. 
In contrast, Mexican Americans tend to support the Democratic Party for its 
welfare and social security policy, which aims to support the poor and the middle-
class. Yet, Mexican American voter turnout is rather low due to their high 
percentage of illegal immigrants who do not hold U.S. citizenship and thus are not 
eligible to vote. As people from Latin America do not automatically share social, 
economic, or historical backgrounds, it would be unreasonable to expect a 
common identity or objective when coming to the United States. 
 
It is important to clarify that the h omogenization under the label  Latino does not 
correspond with the fact that this minority is highly heterogeneous. The terms 
Latino and  Hispanic fail to recognize the rich ethnic and cultural diversity of the 
people they are intended to describe. In fact, most Latinos regard themselves less 
as such and rather in terms of their own national-origin group (Mexican, Cuban, 
Puerto Rican). They call themselves Mexican, when emigrated from Guadalajara 
or Puerto Rican when born on the island. 
Yet, as recent protests against the new immigration law show, common actions by 
Latinos are powerful and increasing impact on decision makers due to the sheer 
numbers. In this context, classification under one label may become advantageous 
for Latinos, a theory outlined in the concept of pan-ethnicity by John A. García. 
[A] sense of pan-ethnicity, or seeing themselves not only in 
national-origin terms but also as part of a broader 
community is a more recent development. The Hispanic or 
Latino label can serve as an important dimension in the 
formation of a Latino community. Yet, it is the meaning                                                                                                                  
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beyond the use of the label that establishes a sense of 
working community and identifies common concerns, 
interests, and situations.
11 
 
Despite heterogeneity,  pan-ethnicity is important in the process of gaining 
political influence. Aggregation of various Latino national-origin groups offers 
more chances to increase influence due to number and power of the affiliated 
groups. Common goals may be more easily achieved due to a larger population 
base. Bilingual education, immigration laws, and social security policy are topics 
of great interest to many Latinos across all nationalities.  
  
Historically, political participation has been quite difficult for Latinos and other 
minorities in the United States. For decades, minorities were kept out of elective, 
appointive, and civil service positions. The Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s 
led by African Americans and their leader Martin Luther King Jr., allowed 
minorities to, for the first time, campaign collectively for their rights to full 
citizenship and voting eligibility. The resulting political consciousness led to 
Jesse Jackson’s “Rainbow Coalition” in the 1980s, constructed to support his 
candidacy for President. Jackson sought to unite several  minority groups in order 
to form a broad coalition of the underprivileged.  
Latinos constituted the second largest minority behind African Americans,  
overwhelmingly supporting Jackson in his campaign to become the Democratic 
nominee for the presidential e lection. “In 1984, Jackson, who had been largely 
unknown in the Latino community, except in Chicago, captured 33 percent of the 
Puerto Rican vote and 17 percent of the Mexican American vote.”
12 Grassroots 
organizations in New York and other states formed “Latinos for Jackson” 
committees to show their support. 
 
In the light of United States civil rights history, examining Latino political 
participation may also serve as a method to judge the American democratic 
system. Since almost every seventh person in the United States is considered to be 
                                                 
11 García, John A.; 3. “Pan-ethnicity refers to a sense of group affinity and identification that 
transcends one’s own national-origin group. A pan-ethnic identity does not necessarily replace 
national-origin affinity, but it includes a broader configuration in defining the group. Latinos or 
Hispanics include several national origins.”(García, 15.) 
12 Geron, 74.                                                                                                                  
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Latino, political participation by this segment of society is an integral part of the 
quality of American democracy.  
If democracy is interpreted as rule by the people, then the 
question of who participates in political d ecisions becomes 
the question of the nature of democracy in a society. Where 
few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the 
more participation there is in decisions, the more 
democracy there is. Such a definition of democracy is 
crude, because i t says little about elections, or free speech, 
or guarantees of minority rights, or majority rule; yet it may 
get at the heart of the matter, since all other institutions 
associated with democracy can be related to the general 
question of who participates  or is able to participate in 
political life.
13 
 
Besides analyzing Latino political efforts in order to assess the quality of 
American democracy, it also behooves us to stay abreast of demographic and 
societal changes. The Latino population grows rapidly and thus increasingly 
shapes not only American political life, but the culture and economy as well. 
Latinos are considered to be a significant economic market with an exceptional 
rate of growth.“[T] he buying power of Latinos has risen 65 percent since 1990 to 
$348 billion today, or more than the GNP of Mexico. The buying power of 
California alone increases by $1billion every six weeks.
14” Considering these 
numbers, it becomes apparent that Latinos are a noteworthy economic and 
political factor due to their ability to financially contribute to political campaigns 
and candidates, thereby shaping U.S. policy. Hence, this presupposes a political 
strategy, which takes into account the interests and issues of Latinos in general 
and their over twenty national-origin g roups in particular. Latino politics take 
place in many social contexts, including societal institutions such as schools, 
clubs, private and publicly organized initiatives, referenda, community 
organizations, and political representation at all levels. 
 
This paper is intended to show how Latinos in general and Mexican Americans, 
Cuban Americans, and Puerto Ricans in particular, engage politically in the 
United States. Latinos execute their influence by voting or in non-electoral 
                                                 
13 Verba, Sidney/ Nie, Norman H.: Participation in America – Political Democracy and Social 
Equality, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1972; 1. 
14 Economist, The:  The Keenest Recruits to the Dream, 153-157, in: Wilson III, Ernest J.: 
Diversity and U.S. Foreign Policy – A Reader, Routledge, New York, 2004; 154.                                                                                                                  
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activities like campaign work or financial contributions. As an individual, one 
participates as a member of society and possibly as a member of an interest group, 
i.e. a party. Thus, to be successful, it is necessary to combine one’s personal 
interest with that of others in order to  form an alliance that, due to its size, may 
have an impact on the political stage.  
To win elective office, two conditions need to be fulfilled: personal will of an 
individual, and the effort of a group, who supports this person. The “winner-
takes-it-all”
15 principle of the U.S. political system requires a broad and strong 
base of support. Therefore, if different national-origin groups who are described 
as Latinos want to campaign for the interests of the Latino population, “it can be 
expected that Latinos w ill seek to participate in the political system as voters, 
volunteers, activists, and candidates for office.”
16  
Participation becomes more successful the broader the common platform is, 
meaning encompassing as many national-origin groups as possible. Thus, Latinos 
may profit from the concept of  pan-ethnicity. An alliance of the various national-
origin groups may be strong enough to elect Latino candidates to office. In the 
past however, Latinos’ strength often was diluted by many differences becoming 
apparent through self-perception and various nationalities.  
This study will show which factors are necessary and which steps were taken to 
gain and enhance Latino political influence. In doing so, it will become clear that 
Mexican Americans, Cuban Americans, and Puerto Ricans all started their 
struggle from diverse backgrounds and possess significantly different goals. 
Although common language unites these three national-origin groups, they do not 
have the same political and economic resources at their disposal. Decisive 
differences in immigration politics, naturalization, and economic opportunities 
become visible and will prove a distinct heterogeneity of Latinos concerning 
political behavior and goals. 
Political activities of Mexican Americans, Cuban Americans, and Puerto Ricans 
will be outlined as well as how they differ from each other. In doing so, it is 
necessary to take notice of their specific histories and legal experiences upon 
                                                 
15 The “winner-takes-it-all” principle is based on the plurality voting system of the United States. 
This system only allows the voter to cast his ballot for one candidate. Whichever candidate 
receives the most votes is the winner, thus, all votes cast for the opponent lapse which is subject of 
heavy criticism by opponents of this system. On the other hand the plurality voting system is one 
of the simplest of all voting systems.   
16 Geron, 93.                                                                                                                  
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arrival in the United States. Furthermore, different demographic factors of t he 
three national-origin groups additionally affect political participation. 
An understanding of Latino political participation should be in the interest of the 
U.S. public as well as scholars engaging in American Studies. This biggest 
minority increasingly makes its presence felt in the electoral arena, especially at 
the state level. In states such as California, Texas, Florida and New Mexico 
Latinos constitute decisive voting blocs. But also, Latinos nationwide enlarge 
their political clout, due to cumulative numbers and a more developed political 
consciousness. With this national and state level significance of the Latino 
electorate, examining their policy preferences and goals has become progressively 
more important to the understanding of the U.S. political scene.  
The approach here is twofold. First, political participation of the Latino 
population as a whole will be researched; using numbers and results from the 
presidential election 2004. In this part of the paper, the concept of  pan-ethnicity 
using t he label  Latino will be used to sum up Spanish-speaking nationalities and 
their political efforts. In order to be eligible to vote, certain legal requirements are 
to be met, so factors that account for voting will be outlined first. In accordance 
with the  large share of non-citizens among the Latino population, it is also 
necessary to examine their non-electoral political activities.  
The second part will portray Latinos in more detail, examining the three largest 
national-origin groups. By demonstrating their specific histories and varied 
experiences and opportunities in U.S. politics, it will become clear that when 
talking about  Latino Politics, it is indispensable to bear in mind the heterogeneity 
of America’s biggest minority and the side effects this has. 
 
 
 
 
2. The Latino Population – An Overview 
 
The Latino population neither constitutes a racial group nor does it share a 
common culture. What all Latinos do have in common though, is a connection by 
ancestry to Latin America where Spanish is spoken. Immigrants, who just 
recently arrived in the United States, are considered to be Latinos as well as                                                                                                                  
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people who have been living there for generations. Children of immigrants who 
are, on the one hand, shaped by their parents’ set of values and traditions, and on 
the other hand influenced by United States culture, might not have much in 
common with illegal immigrants who just recently crossed the border and perform 
blue-collar work. Latinos come from twenty-two countries as diverse as Cuba and 
Mexico with different cultures and histories and thus varying perceptions of their 
new environment. 
The following chapter provides an overview of the Latino population in general, 
only partially being responsive to its national-origin groups. By this means, a 
broader picture is given before going into more detail in the second part of this 
study. The minority is analyzed on the basis of demography, socioeconomic 
status, and characteristics of the labor force.  
 
 
 
2.1. Latino Demography 
Between 1990 and 2000 the Latino population increased 58 percent, while the 
total U.S. population increased 13 percent.
17 Within the Latino population 
Mexicans remained the largest national-origin group, constituting for two-thirds 
of all Latinos, followed by Puerto Ricans and Cubans. Due to the proximity of 
their home country and an almost 3000 miles long borderline, it is self-evident 
why Mexicans enter the United States, especially after taking into account the 
economic differences between the two countries. 
Since the 1980’s, significant numbers of Latino immigrants have come from 
Central America and settle in areas with established Mexican, Cuban, or Puerto 
Rican majorities. “ Hispanics who reported other origins increased by 96.9 
percent, from 5.1 million to 10.0 million.”
18 These “other Hispanics” are to a 
large extent from El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. As a result of 
increased immigration from these countries the proportionate distribution of the 
Latino population changes. It becomes more diverse in terms of national-origin 
groups, and thus in culture and habits.  
                                                 
17 Guzmán, Betsy: The Hispanic Population 2000, U.S. Census Bureau, 2001, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf; 2.  
18 U.S. Census Bureau: The Hispanic Population 2000, 2001, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf; 2.                                                                                                                  
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Table 1: Latino Population of the United States 
by Place of Origin
Pew Hispanic Center: Hispanics - A People in Motion, Washington D.C., 2005; 3.
Cuba 4 %
Dominican Republic 3 %
El Salvador 3 %
Other Central
 America 4%
South America 5 %
Other Latino 8 %
Puerto Rico 10 %
Mexico 63 %
 
 
Nearly 70 percent of the Latino population live in only five states: California, 
Texas, New York, New Jersey, and Florida.
19 Whereas Mexican Americans 
constitute the vast majority in Texas (83%)  and California (84%) the Latino 
population in New York, New Jersey, and Florida is more diverse. Dominicans 
and Puerto Ricans mainly populate New York, especially the metropolitan area of 
New York City. Florida is home to almost the entire Cuban population residing in 
the United States, constituting 41 percent of Latinos there.
20 
The more than 40 million Latinos living in the United States are almost equally 
divided by those native born and foreign born, indicating high immigration rates. 
As the Pew Hispanic Center asserts,  
the number of migrants coming to the United States each 
year, legally and illegally, grew very rapidly starting in the 
mid-1990s, hit a peak at the end of the decade, and then 
declined substantially after 2001. By 2004, the annual 
inflow  of foreign-born persons was down 24% from its all-
time high in 2000.
21 
 
 Nevertheless, Latinos still constitute the leading ethnic group of immigrants 
coming to the United States, well ahead of Asians.  
 
                                                 
19 Kaiser Family Foundation/ Pew Hispanic Center: Latinos in California, Texas, New York, 
Florida, and New Jersey, 2004, http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/7056.cfm; 1. 
20 Kaiser Family Foundation/ Pew Hispanic Center: Latinos in California, Texas, New York, 
Florida, and New Jersey, 2004, http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/7056.cfm; 1. 
21Passel, Jeffrey S. / Suro, Roberto: Rise, Peak, and Decline: Trends in U.S. Immigration 1992-
2004, Pew Hispanic Center, 2005, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/53.pdf; i.                                                                                                                  
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2.2. Latino Labor Force and Socioeconomic Status 
Due  to its brisk growth, Latinos are the second leading labor force behind whites. 
“Latinos now make up 13 % of the U.S. labor force, but they are expected to 
account for about one half of the growth in the labor force between now and 
2020.”
22 Large-scale immigration and high birth rates are the main reasons for 
this prediction.  
 
Table 2: The U.S. Labor Force: A Racial and Ethnic Breakdown 
              
         All Workers  Hispanics 
Population (age 16+)     223,653,344  28,240,747 
Labor Force     148,612,727  19,501,923 
Employment        140,554,632  18,169,653 
Unemployment     8,058,095  1,332,270 
Labor Force participation rate (%)  66.4  69.1 
Employment-to-population ratio (%)  62.8  64.3 
Unemployment rate (%)     5.4  6.8 
Source: Pew Hispanic Center: Hispanics-A People in Motion, Washington D.C., 2005; 8.   
 
„In the third quarter of 2004, there were 28 million Latinos of working age (16 or 
older).”
23 Even though the unemployment rate amounts to only 6.8 %, Latinos in 
general are less educated and experienced than workers of o ther races due to a 
high percentage of immigrants, thereby explaining their heavy concentration in 
relatively low-skilled jobs. “Latinos account for more than 30% of workers in 
private household services and about 20% of workers in construction, agriculture, 
forestry and fishing, non-durable manufacturing, and eating, drinking and lodging 
services.”
24 In contrast, Latinos are rarely represented in high-skilled occupations 
such as architecture or computer science.  
“In Los Angeles County, a center of postindustrial America, it is estimated that 50 
percent of manufacturing workers are Latinos, both legal and undocumented 
workers from Latin America.”
  25 Given the high number of working-class Latinos, 
and their impact on the economy they are canvassed by the labor movement to 
organize, which offers them opportunities to influence working conditions and 
make their voices heard. As Latinos predominantly work in low-skilled jobs, their 
                                                 
22 Pew Hispanic Center: Hispanics-A People in Motion, 2. 
23 Pew Hispanic Center: Hispanics-A People in Motion, 8. 
24 Pew Hispanic Center: Hispanics-A People in Motion, 9. 
25 Geron, 97.                                                                                                                  
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median income is less than that of whites, explaining why one-fifth of the Latino 
population in the United States lives below the poverty line.
26 About one quarter 
of Latinos do not own assets other than “a car or unsecured debt. Most Hispanics 
[…] fall into the lowest category of wealth and the size of their middle-class is 
relatively small in itself and in comparison to whites.”
27 The gap between Latinos 
and whites in terms of wealth is much higher than in terms of income.  
Even though the median income of Latino […] households 
is two-thirds as high as that of White households their 
wealth is only one-tenth as much. The reasons for this 
disparity include the facts that minorities have more limited 
access to financial markets and face greater barriers to 
homeownership. 
28 
 
To own a home concurrently connotes more own capital of a household g iving 
them an advantage in financial opportunities over renters and other households. 
Effectively, Latino homeowners have a net worth that is half as much as the 
wealth of non-Latino homeowners.
29 Given these economic conditions many 
Latinos rely on social  welfare programs. Since they are not accessible for illegal 
immigrants the debate over the future of Social Security is of special interest to 
Latinos. 
In the State of the Union address on February 2, 2005, President Bush proposed a 
reformation of the Social Security system. The plan envisions the possibility for 
persons under the age of  55 to either use new individual investment accounts or 
to remain in the current system. Benefits for both current recipients and for 
persons older than 55 years would remain unchanged. To finance his plan, 
President Bush accepts that assured Social Security benefits may be less than 
under current law for those under age 55. Thus, the president’s proposal splits the 
population into two groups. “Persons age 55 or older will experience no change in 
the determination of their Social Security benefits and will not have access to 
                                                 
26U.S. Census Bureau: Income Stable, Poverty Rate Increases, Percentage of Americans Without 
Health Insurance Unchanged, August 30, 2005, http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/income_wealth/005647.html. 
The Office of Management and Budget at the Census Bureau defined the poverty threshold in 
2004 as $19,307 for a family of four; $15,067 for a family of three; $12,334 for a family of two; 
and $9,645 for an individual. 
27 Kochhar, Rakesh: The Wealth of Hispanic Households: 1996 to 2002, Pew Hispanic Center, 
Washington D.C., 2004, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/34.pdf; 1. 
28 Kochhar, 1. 
29 See: Kochhar, 1.                                                                                                                  
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voluntary personal investment accounts. Those age 54 or under would be in the 
new system with the option of personal investment accounts.”
30 
Not only do L atinos, currently over the age of 65, rely heavily on Social Security 
retirement benefits as a source of income, but future generations will as well 
since, as aforementioned, many Latinos tend to hold low-paying jobs and are 
therefore less likely to receive an employment based pension. Furthermore, low 
accumulation of wealth during their years as active workers contributes to the 
need of Social Security retirement benefits. Considering the median age of 36 
years, the majority of the Latino population will b e affected in the case that the 
benefits are reduced. Furthermore, given the relative youthfulness of Latinos they 
soon will constitute the largest base contributing to Social Security. Thus, they do 
not only profit but also represent an important factor in maintaining the system.  
 
Considering the above-mentioned demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, Latino sway on societal developments in general and politics in 
particular becomes apparent. The overview was intentionally brief to offer some 
necessary background information but to not deviating from the actual topic of 
this study. The debate about the Social Security system reveals that due to the 
general economic status of Latinos this issue is of strong interest. In the following 
part, Latino political options and engagement will be analyzed thereby paying 
attention to the factors that are fundamental to be politically active.  
 
 
 
 
I. Latinos and U.S. Politics 
 
Latino politics in the United States expanded substantially after World War II and 
especially during the civil rights era. Achievements during this time, including the 
Voting Rights Act in 1965 and the extension of voting rights legislation to 
language minorities in 1975, improved conditions for political engagement. The 
post civil rights era of the 1980s and 1990s generated a rapid ascent of Latinos to 
                                                 
30 Fry, Richard/ Kochhar, Rakesh/ Passel, Jeffrey/ Suro, Roberto: Hispanics and the Social 
Security Debate, Pew Hispanic Center, Washington D.C., 2005, 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/43.pdf; 1.                                                                                                                  
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elected office. “In 2004, there were 4,853 Latino elected officials, 29 percent of 
them Latinas.”
31 Despite this indication of strong political engagement, Latinos 
still do not even come close in accounting for as many elected officials as Anglos 
or African Americans relative to their total population.  
Political activities in which Latinos engage range from voting in presidential 
elections to community engagement on local school boards. While v oting is 
restricted to citizens, non-electoral engagement is open to anyone, which is 
especially important to Latinos due to their high percentage of non-citizens. 
Community organizations as well as Latino civil rights groups do not require 
citizenship in  order to be active within their structures. In fact, they support 
Latinos in receiving U.S. citizenship and guide them through the application 
process.  
Yet, holding U.S. citizenship does not necessarily lead to political activism. It 
serves as a prerequisite to participate within the electoral system but other factors 
also play a decisive role for Latinos to vote. In the following, crucial factors for 
Latino political engagement will be evaluated. The 2004 presidential election and 
examination of party affiliation will serve as latest instances for Latino politics in 
the electoral arena and their perception by the political elite. In addition, on the 
basis of high rates of non-citizens among the Latino population, it is essential to 
examine non-electoral opportunities and activities to engage politically. In this 
context, Latino civil rights and interest groups comprise significant entities that 
account for increasing political engagement among Latinos by reason of extensive 
grassroots activities. 
 
 
 
 
3. Factors for Voting 
 
Several factors influence a group’s ability to gain political impact, whether 
identified by race, gender, ethnicity, age, or issue. Political and economic 
resources, level of organization, and knowledge of how the system functions are 
essential in order to maximize a group’s sway. 
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Regarded as a collective effort, voting is the most powerful action of political 
participation since it generates a definite outcome. There are a number of factors   
that elucidate voting behavior. “The best-established empirical generalization is 
that participation rates increase with income and education levels or, combining 
these variables, socioeconomic status (SES). […] It is especially strong in the 
United States.”
32 Being a member in political organizations s uch as political 
parties further increases the probability to vote or to be politically active in some 
other way, although it is not a prerequisite.  
Formal organizational membership does not appear to be 
necessary in order for a group to increase participation. 
Informal group affiliation suffices, especially when it takes 
the form of ‘group consciousness’. Group consciousness 
exists when a person combines identity with a group with a 
sense of unfair treatment by the political system and with a 
sense that something can be done about the treatment.
33 
 
Nonetheless, besides socioeconomic status and group consciousness there are 
additional factors which need to be addressed in order to understand Latino voting 
behavior. Demographic, structural, and situational factors play a significant role 
in Latino political activity and its relevance for U.S. politics in general.  
 
 
 
3.1. Voting Eligibility 
Even though restrictions such as the poll tax
34 do not exist anymore there are 
other formal requirements that have to be f ulfilled in order to be eligible to vote. 
Anyone seeking to participate in the democratic process through voting must, at a 
minimum, be a United States citizen, 18 years old, and registered to vote. For the 
foreign-born Latino population in the United States, meeting the eligibility criteria 
requires affirmative steps. The first step is the naturalization petition, which 
                                                 
32 Uhlaner, Carole Jean: Political Activity and Preferences of African Americans, Latinos, and 
Asian Americans, in: Jaynes, Gerald D. (Ed.): Immigration and Race, Yale University Press, Yale, 
2000; 220. 
33 Uhlaner, 220. 
34 In the United States, the poll tax has been attributed to voting rights. Poll taxes enacted in 
Southern states between 1889 and 1910 disenfranchised many blacks as well as poor whites, since 
payment of the tax was a prerequisite for voting. By the 1940s some of these taxes had been 
abolished, and in 1964 the 24th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibited the poll tax as a 
requirement for voting in federal elections. In 1966 this prohibition was extended to all elections 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled that such a tax violated the “equal protection” clause of 
the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.                                                                                                                  
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requires five years of U.S. legal residence, interviews with the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, the paying of filing and application fees, and passing of an 
English language and U.S. civics examination.  
The second step is registration to vote. Registration requirements differ among the 
states, each having its own laws about who may register and vote. However, all 
states require U.S. citizenship in order to be eligible to vote in federal and state 
elections. Additionally, citizens are not allowed to be registered in more than one 
state. 
While the States of Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin allow for registration on 
Election Day 46 states and the District of Columbia require registration between 
10 and 50 days in advance. Only North Dakota does not require registration 
asking instead for presentation of personal identification at the polls.
35 Thirty 
States and the District of Columbia require that voters be residents for a period 
between 1 and 50 days prior to Election Day. Additionally, most States deny 
registration and voting to convicted felons and those judged mentally 
incompetent.
36 
Only after U.S. citizens fill out the “National Voter Registration Form” and send 
it to the respective state authority are they eligible to vote. With the exception of 
New Hampshire and Wyoming, who do not accept this form, and North Dakota, 
which does not have registration, this is the most common method.  
Registration applications may be obtained from either the local election official, 
or through registration outreach programs sponsored by civil rights groups. It is 
also possible to register when applying for a driver’s license or identity card. In 
1993, C ongress enacted the National Voter Registration Act (also known as the 
“Motor Voter Act”). The act is designed to enhance voting opportunities for every 
American by making it easier for all Americans to exercise their fundamental 
right to vote. “Motor Voter”-Registration connotes that voter registration must be 
available at the same time when people apply for a driver's license or its renewal. 
The act also secures voter registration opportunities when an individual applies 
for services, service renewal, or address change at a state institution. 
                                                 
35 See: 106
th Congress 2
nd Session: Our American Government (2000 Edition), Washington D.C. 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_documents&docid=f:hd216
.106. 
36 See: United States Election Assistance Commission, 
http://www.eac.gov/docs/NVRA%20FINAL%20UPDATE%2003-13-06.pdf.                                                                                                                  
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Even though information on how to register and the registration form itself are 
also available in Spanish, many Latinos consider registration a challenge due to 
its complexity. 
 
 
 
3.2. Structural Factors  
Structural f actors indicate how political institutions function, thereby “focusing on 
access, an individual’s or group’s legal standing, rights and protections, and the 
formal requirements for participation.”
37 In the 19
th and beginning of the 20
th 
century southern states enacted poll tax laws, which often included a grandfather 
clause that allowed any adult male whose father or grandfather had voted to vote 
without paying the tax. These laws achieved the desired effect of disenfranchising 
African and Native Americans,  as well as whites of non-British descent. With the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 imposition of such 
laws was declared unlawful. 
Today it is rather a matter of access to information than legal restrictions. Political 
institutions such as civil rights and lobby groups play an important role in 
attracting new voters and serve as sources for information. In the 20
th century 
several organizations have been founded in order to represent the interests of the 
growing Latino population. In 1929 the League of United Latin American Citizens 
(LULAC) was formed, and in 1968, created the Mexican American Legal Defense 
and Education Fund (MALDEF).  The National Council of La Raza (NCLR) was 
founded the same year, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense  and Education Fund 
(PRLDEF) followed in 1972.  
Each aims to advance the economic condition, educational attainment, political 
influence, health, and civil rights of the Hispanic population by serving as 
interfaces between the Latino population and elected  officials in order to secure 
adequate representation.  They also conduct applied research, policy analysis, and 
advocacy, providing a Latino perspective in academic discourse.  
Even though  MALDEF and  PRLDEF were founded as specific national-origin 
group organizations, over the years they changed to become representatives for all 
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Latinos in the United States. In chapter 5 these organizations will be examined 
more closely. 
Economically, the  United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC) 
advocates and promotes the success of Hispanic owned businesses. The USHCC 
aims to implement and strengthen national programs that support the economic 
development of Hispanic firms and provides technical assistance for Hispanic 
business associations and entrepreneurs. It a lso promotes international trade 
between Latino businesses in the United States and Latin America. Thus, the 
Latino population disposes of an economic institution tailor-made for their needs. 
Nevertheless, Latinos still may call upon the services of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce. 
Even think-tanks such as the Pew Research Center reacted to the ethnic changes 
in the United States and founded the Pew Hispanic Center in 2001.
38 Access to 
political information and issues is another very important structural factor to 
attract Latino votes, with TV as the most important medium. Two Spanish-
language networks,  Univision and  Telemundo, are available throughout the 
country. Both networks are produced in the United States but their programs are 
exclusively in Spanish. Thus, Latinos, who do not speak English, may receive 
information on political, cultural, and economic issues in the United States. With 
these two networks the Latino population is not only visible but also disposes of a 
medium to reach almost every household  throughout the country, thereby 
distributing its point of view.  
Following television, Spanish-language newspapers are the most influential 
medium for Latinos to create political awareness. Six large daily newspapers are 
published in the United States. Two are published on the West Coast, two in the 
Southeast, and two in New York City. With a circulation of 120,000, the largest is 
La Opinión, which is released in Los Angeles. Like television, the newspapers 
need to address a highly heterogeneous community w hose demographics changed 
significantly within the last twenty years. Nevertheless, the big daily papers such 
as  La Opinión or  El Daily News, which is a separately edited and sold bilingual 
product of the  New York Daily News, dedicate sections to various n ational-origin 
groups in order to address their demands. 
                                                 
38 See: page 3.                                                                                                                  
  21
Given the various Spanish-language interest and civil rights groups as well as the 
large media market, Latinos with low or non English proficiency are given the 
possibility to gather information on U .S. issues. Thus, they may follow recent 
developments and politics involving them into U.S. society.  
 
 
 
3.3. Demographic Factors 
Even though the Latino population continues to grow faster than any other group 
in the United States, demographic growth does  not necessarily result in broader 
political influence. In order to be able to increase Latino political participation on 
a nationwide level, which primarily means voting, it is necessary to understand 
“different dimensions of the Latino population: first,  the total population of 
Latinos; second, the Latino voting-age population (those over eighteen); third, the 
citizen voting-age population; fourth, the  registered voting-age population; and 
fifth, the turnout of Latino voters.”
39 
 
Of the 41.3 million Latinos in 2004 only 16 million were eligible to vote in the 
Presidential election. Eligibility in this case means that the 16 million were U.S. 
citizens above the age of eighteen years. Of the eligible voters, however, only 9.3 
million were registered and 7.5 million actually voted.
40  The large difference 
between the size of the Latino population and of the Latino electorate is mainly 
the result of two factors: on the one hand, Latinos are overwhelmingly young. A 
quarter of the Latino Population is under the age o f eighteen,
41 and thus not 
eligible to vote. On the other hand, immigrants make up more than half the 
voting-age population and only a small share of them have become citizens.  In 
total, around 60 percent of Latinos are not eligible to vote. 
Additionally,  voter registration and turnout rates are historically low among 
Latino citizens in comparison to other ethnic and racial groups.
42 Low registration 
and turnout rates are mainly due to lower income attainment levels, higher rates of 
                                                 
39 Geron, 97. 
40 Suro, Roberto/Fry, Richard/Passel, Jeffrey: Hispanics and the 2004 Election: Population, 
Electorate and Voters, Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, DC, 2005, 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/48.pdf; 2.  
41 U.S. Census Bureau: The Hispanic Population in the United States: 2004, Table 1.2, 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hispanic/ASEC2004/2004CPS_tab1.2a.html.  
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poverty, and lower levels of education attainment. “Hispanics are more likely to 
be poor than other groups in American society,”
43 even though they comprise 13 
percent of the U.S. labor force, the second-biggest ethnic group behind whites. As 
above-mentioned, Latinos, mostly recent immigrants, are mainly employed in 
low-skilled occupations where they earn less than the average worker.  
Low education levels contribute to the problematic economic situation of many 
Latinos. “Thirty six percent of Hispanic workers lack a high school degree,” and 
only 12.5 received a College degree.
44 These numbers are mainly due to the large 
percentage of Mexican American immigrants who lack a sufficient level of 
English proficiency and are therefore relegated to work in low-skilled jobs. 
The proportion o f Latino adults who are U.S. citizens varies widely among Latino 
national-origin groups. Puerto Ricans are native-born U.S. citizens regardless of 
whether they were born on the island of Puerto Rico or the U.S. mainland.                        
About 72 percent of Latinos of Cuban origin are U.S. citizens and only 58 percent 
of Mexican origin.
45 The low number of citizens with Mexican origin is due to the 
vast proportion of Mexican immigrants illegally crossing the border every year. 
 
 
 
3.4. Situational factors  
Situational factors are considered to be “issues, controversies, charismatic 
candidates, and the like, which stir interest in specific elections, office races, and 
propositions.”
46 Decisive situational factors to increase Latino political awareness 
were Propositions 187 and 227 in California in the 1990’s. 
On November 9, 1994, the California electorate passed Proposition 187 with 60 
percent support, banning illegal immigrants from public education, welfare 
benefits, as well as other social services provided by the state. Proposition 187 
was designed to restrict the inflow of Latino immigrants, mainly from Mexico, 
and to facilitate the deportation of illegal aliens to their home country. It also 
required that teachers, doctors, welfare workers, and police  officers report to the 
                                                 
43 San Juan Cafferty, Pastora/ Engstrom, David W.: Hispanics in the United States – An Agenda 
for the Twenty-First Century, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 2000; xv. 
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Office of Immigration and Naturalization Services any knowledge of illegal 
immigrants, so that they may be deported. 
With Proposition 187 Latinos in general and Mexicans in particular were viewed  
as the sources of a range of economic and social problems 
in the state. These factors included designating all 
immigrants as a burden, characterizing the ‘culprits’ as 
Latinos who negatively impact the economy, increasing 
social service budget expenditures and overcrowding health 
facilities.
47 
 
Then-governor Pete Wilson, a Republican, endorsed Proposition 187 in the midst 
of a reelection campaign. Wilson “needed an issue to promote his candidacy and 
propel himself into a run for President in 1996.”
48 This political strategy 
mobilized Latinos and Latino-based organizations, which organized voter 
registration campaigns and mass demonstrations. High School and middle school 
students began protesting throughout California. Labor unions, social service 
organizations, and elected officials also publicly demonstrated against the 
Proposition. Even the Mexican Consul of Los Angeles publicly articulated his 
concerns regarding this initiative.
49 Shortly before the November election, Latinos 
demonstrated in large numbers in downtown Los Angeles against the bill.  
“The initiative split the electorate along partisan, racial, and ethnic lines. While 
the majority of non-Hispanic whites saw this as an honest attempt to deal with the 
illegal immigrant problem, most Latinos saw the initiative as ‘anti-Latino’”
50, and 
Governor Wilson as a demagogue.    
Table 3: Voter Support for Proposition 187       
              
Ethnicity/Race  Percent of  Percent Who Voted    Percent Who Voted 
of Voters  Voters by Group  For Proposition 187    Against Proposition 187 
             
White  81  63     37 
Black  5  47     53 
Latino  8  23     77 
Asian  4  47     53 
Source: Los Angeles Times exit poll, Nov. 10, 1994 in: Geron, Kim: Latino Political Power,  
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2005; 85.     
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This clear ethnic and racial split may be explained by using the  Ethnic In-group 
Favoritism Hypothesis. 
From this perspective motivation to maintain a positive 
sense of social identity leads members of different racial or 
ethnic groups to view their own subculture in more 
favorable terms than other subcultures. Shared threat 
among group members can increase the salience of group 
identity, promote a more cohesive and homogenous view of 
the in-group, and thereby magnify this tendency.
51 
 
The hypothesis assumes that Latinos in general are more favorable towards 
Mexicans in California than non-Hispanic whites, which also has an impact on 
attitudes toward Proposition 187. “Perceptions of fairness are maximized when 
evaluation of a group is congruent with the valence of outcomes allocated to that 
group.”
52 Since Proposition  187 contains negative effects for Latinos, mainly 
Mexicans, it is more likely to be considered fair by non-Hispanic whites than 
Latinos. Thus, rejection of Proposition 187 is regarded to be more common 
among Latinos than non-Hispanic whites. 
Cohesive opposition by the Latino community in California demonstrated a 
notable racial divide in regard to the rights of illegal immigrants, but also marked 
a turning point for Latino politics. Before Proposition 187, naturalization rates 
among Latinos were quite low.  Many viewed their stay in the United States as 
temporary and believed they sought to return to their home country when they had 
earned enough money. After the California electorate accepted Proposition 187, 
however, naturalization applications sky rocked.  
Between 1994 to 1997 citizenship applications to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Services grew from 
540,000 to 1.4 million, and most were Latinos. Between 
1990 and 1996, 876,000 Latinos naturalized, and their 
voting behavior has changed the nature of t he Latino 
electorate. Because of Proposition 187’s presence on the 
ballot in 1994, first-generation immigrants in California 
were twice as likely to have voted as their counterparts in 
states that did not have a similar anti-immigrant measure on 
the ballot. Second-generation immigrants in California 
were 83 percent more likely to have voted as their peers 
elsewhere.
53   
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Since 31 percent of Latinos in the United States live in California, the Proposition 
and its political concomitants directly affected one-third of the Latino community. 
With this experience in mind, especially newly naturalized Latinos used their 
recently acquired right to cast their vote. As a result, Proposition 187 became one 
of the most important situational factors for Latinos to vote.  
Furthermore, Latino political awareness was increased by Proposition 227. It 
required all public school instruction to be conducted in English.  This ballot 
initiative that restructured education for language minority students was approved 
by a majority of  the electorate in the primary election of June 2, 1998. The new 
law became part of the Education Code in August, just before the beginning of the 
1998-99 academic year. T he State Department of Education created guidelines for 
the development of local  “limited English proficient” (LEP)  programs due to a 
high percentage (25 percent) of students who  cannot understand English well 
enough to keep up in school. 
Advocates of Proposition 227 said bilingual education has failed in actual practice 
and effectively turned out to be Spanish-only for most of California’s non-English 
speaking students. Opponents of the proposition, however, argued that it puts 
limited English speaking children of all ages and languages into one classroom 
and that it takes away parents' rights to choose what is best for their children.  
Like Proposition 187, Proposition 227 also served as a catalyst to increase Latino 
political involvement. Latino participation not only directly affected these 
initiatives; it also served as a fundamental foundation for growing political 
influence of Latinos on a statewide level in California. With the election of Cruz 
Bustamante as Lieutenant Governor in 2000 the number of Latinos in the state 
assembly and senate increased. Policy initiatives, particularly those negatively 
directed toward Latinos, forced Latino organizations and leaders to mobilize 
broader parts of their communities. 
 
Besides demographic, structural, and situational factors, the perception of how 
valuable political participation appears is an  important factor for voting. “The 
more worthwhile political activity appears to be and the more benefit is to be 
derived from encouraging it, the more participation one would expect.”
54 
Indicators for this thesis are the above-mentioned Propositions in California, 
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which led to a noteworthy increase of Latino political participation. In addition, 
charismatic candidates and leaders may bias a possible voters view of the role of 
politics and convince the person to actively participate. When a candidate is able 
to make political action appear important to the interest of a group probability of 
active engagement increases. This, however, also depends partly on the relation 
between those interests and the political agenda. It also depends on the 
candidate’s skill i n either changing the “group’s concerns or the political agenda 
so that they match more closely or at least are perceived to.”
55  
 As analyzed above, charismatic leaders are not the only factors influencing 
Latino political participation. Propositions 187 a nd 227 in California exemplified  
situational factors but obviously were not the only ones. Since they were widely 
recognized and caused media attention throughout the country both Propositions 
served as examples. Likewise, the organizations mentioned as i mportant structural 
factors are the largest but do not display all of Latino interest and civil rights 
groups. Nevertheless, the aforementioned factors and examples are essential to 
analyze and understand Latino political engagement in the United States.  
 
 
 
 
4. The 2004 Presidential Election and Latino Party Affiliation 
 
Party affiliation has long been a strong indicator of political behavior in the 
United States. According to a 1999 survey, 48 percent of all Latinos identified 
themselves as Democrats, 23  percent as Independents, and only 19 percent as 
Republicans.
56 In the 2000 presidential election, 62 percent of the Latino vote 
went to Al Gore and only 35 percent to George W. Bush.
57 Regarding these 
figures party affiliation seems to suggest voting behavior of the Latino electorate. 
Recent figures of the 2004 presidential election, however, indicate that  factors 
other than party affiliation influence Latino voting behavior.  
In a 2004 survey, 45 percent of registered Latinos considered themselves to be 
Democrats, only 20 percent said they were Republicans and 21 percent 
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Independents.
58 Data of various exit polls concluded, however, that President 
Bush received around 40 percent of all Latino votes cast suggesting that party 
affiliation does not necessarily t ranslate into voting behavior.
59 In 2000, the 
National Council of La Raza stated that Latino voters “look at individual 
candidates rather than party affiliations.”
60 This was primarily due to former 
President Clinton who managed to attract the vast majority  of Latinos because of 
his charisma and the way he addressed their concerns. Although, issues are mostly 
decisive in converting voters from one party to another it is significant to 
understand “that in some cases, particularly with Latinos, it is the people, rather 
than the issues, that have been the axis of struggle in political party 
identification.”
61 
 
Besides charismatic candidates, factors such as acculturation
62 and traditionalism 
play a significant role for Latinos to engage with one party or the other. The 
longer Latino immigrants live in the United States and grow accustomed to the 
way of life “the more likely they are to identify as Democrats and to have strong 
party preferences.”
63 
 In earlier research, different theories of party identification emerged, claiming 
that personal circumstances and education are fundamental in developing a certain 
political view. The  Early Socialization Model, which regards party identification 
to be instilled “in early childhood, primarily from parental influence,”
64 is 
supplemented by the  Stability Model, which claims that “individuals obtain a 
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party identification early in life and retain that identification for the long term.”
65 
The latter model assumes that, despite some exceptions, neither women nor men 
are likely to cross party lines to vote in presidential elections. Instead it argues 
that “party voting in the 1980s was every bit as common  – or uncommon  – as it 
had been in the 1950s. Voting in line with one’s party in 1984 and 1988 was as 
common as it had been in 1952 and 1956.”
66 
Besides these theories, there are three determinants of partisanship that exert a 
strong impact on voting patterns. These are party perception, policy preferences, 
and socio-economic forces.
67 To understand Latino voting behavior these factors 
need to be examined.  
Party perception is the most important determinant, given the fact that only 
around 10 percent believe that the Republican Party shows concern for Latinos.
68 
Approaches like those in California in the 1990’s are important to this perception. 
TV advertisements sponsored by Republican Governor Pete Wilson showing 
Mexicans streaming across the border, caused great unrest among Latinos. In 
contrast, in Florida, party perception caused strong support for Republicans by 
Cuban Americans. After  fleeing the Castro Regime in the 1960s for political and 
economic reasons, most Cubans living in Florida perceived the Republican Party 
as more militant anti-communists than the Democrats. The failure of the Bay of 
Pigs Invasion of 1961 by exiled Cubans, after President Kennedy denied U.S. Air 
Force support confirmed this attitude. Younger Cubans, however, are entering the 
electorate with no direct experience of the 1959 Revolution and its consequences, 
and therefore are generally more responsive to policy voting. 
Policy preference is the second critical determinant. Among Latinos Education 
(54 %) and Health Care and Medicare (51%) were ranked 1
st and 2
nd as extremely 
important in determining their vote for president in 2004.
69 Both issues are widely 
perceived to belong to the core of the Democratic Party, which advocates more 
supportive government policies than the Republicans. Research has shown that 
the Democratic Party attracts Latinos because they care about the expansion of 
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health care and social insurance programs.
70 Furthermore, Republicans tend to 
take a tough stand against immigration, especially illegal immigration, an 
important issue for Latinos.  
As part of a comprehensive immigration reform, in 2004 President Bush proposed 
the creation of a new Temporary Worker Program. To match foreign workers 
with American employers for jobs that no American is willing to do, temporary 
workers will be able to register for legal status for a fixed time period and then be 
required to return home. Thus, the Republican Party addresses the needs of the 
majority of Latinos and may be perceived more positively. Critics, however, 
argue this to be a waste of time. Gimpel and Kaufmann allege that the 
Republicans’ “time may be better spent on trying to close the gender gap, o r 
attracting the loyalties of white working-class voters who have regularly shown 
an independent streak.”
71 
In contrast to the first two determinants, Coffin views socio-economic forces as 
“not critical in determining Latino partisanship. In theory, poorer  constituencies 
are thought more likely to align with the Democrats, given the perception of the 
party’s support for disadvantaged groups and their association with more activist 
government programs.”
72  In the case of Latino voters, however, this is only 
partially true. In 1999, 36 percent of Latinos who earned more than $100,000 a 
year considered themselves to be Democrats, in comparison to only 26 percent, 
who said they would vote republican.
73 Other research agrees, “that income does 
not have a significant effect on Latino partisanship.”
74 However, high-income 
Latinos tend to describe themselves significantly as Independents instead of 
Democrats. 
Since party perception and policy preferences are influenced by short-term factors 
and are thus quite easy to change, Latino partisanship may be subject to change. 
This means that Democratic candidates cannot rely on unquestionable Latino 
support, but must work on attracting this important constituency.  
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These approaches may explain party affiliation and voting behavior for Latinos in 
general, but do not consider differences between national-origin groups. Puerto 
Ricans and Mexican Americans tend to both vote predominantly democratic, 
whereas most Cubans support the Republican Party. In July 2004, 50 percent of 
registered Puerto Ricans and 47 percent of Mexican Americans said they consider 
themselves as Democrats, whereas 52 percent of Cuban Americans regarded 
themselves as Republicans.
75  
With the growing Latino population and subsequent increase of potential voters, 
both parties acknowledged the necessity of courting Hispanics. Traditionally 
Latinos tended to support the Democratic Party by large margins. Democrats 
“used the past to bolster its present relationship with Latinos, asked Latinos to 
think about issues, imagined Latinos as a diverse group, and reminded Latinos  – 
although subtly that it had their allegiances in the past. By doing so, it represents 
itself as thinking like Latinos […].”
76 
 Hence, during the last years presidential candidates of the Republican Party 
gained increasing numbers of Latino votes. The approximately 40 percent of 
George W. Bush in 2004 constitute the best result for a Republican nominee 
among Latinos so far. This can be explained with changing demography of 
Latinos, and with Bush’s and t he Republicans’ exceptional effort to court Latinos. 
“The Republican Party attempted to envision a future with Latinos, to express 
values and emotions that they believe the Party and Latinos share, to articulate 
Latinos’ similarities with each other and with all Americans, and to proclaim that 
the party wants Latinos.”
77 By doing so, Republican strategists and campaign 
managers aimed to present their party as similar to Latinos and aware of its needs. 
It emphasizes its willingness to pay attention to issues  important to Latinos and 
represents itself as interested in the minority. 
Given the aforementioned reasons, an understanding of Latino party preference is 
in the interest of political leaders of both major parties. This is reflected by their 
recent campaigns for the presidential election in 2004. Both, President Bush and 
Senator Kerry, made unprecedented efforts to court the Latino electorate by 
running Spanish-language commercials and campaigning heavily in Latino 
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communities. In fact, each candidate even  went so far as to promise to appoint 
Latinos to their cabinet  to demonstrate their commitment to the minority. 
 
Discourse concerning Latino policy positions is more up-to-date than ever. For 
years, most experts saw a decisive majority of Latinos voting democratic, since 
the Democrats have been more sensitive to Latino interests than Republicans. 
Within the last decade, however, this perception has changed as Republican 
candidates for state and national offices continue to receive increasing support 
from Latinos. This circumstance illustrates a larger Latino heterogeneity than 
many previously believed. Although the vast majority still identifies with and 
votes for the Democratic Party, there are variations within the Latino electorate.  
 
 
 
4.1. Latinos and the Republican Party 
George W. Bush attracted a substantial and increasing share of the Latino vote 
both in 2000 and 2004, compared to previous Republican presidential candidates. 
Latino support for Bush increased roughly 5 percent from the 2000 election, when 
he received 35 percent, to 2004, receiving around 40 percent. This remarkable 
increase can be partly explained by Bush’s numerous efforts to court Latino 
voters. The Bush-Cheney re-election committee officially launched its Latino 
outreach efforts at a n April 2004 rally in Orlando, Florida. By founding “Viva 
Bush Coalitions” in various states Bush’s campaign team explicitly targeted the 
biggest minority in the country. “Viva Bush Coalitions” were tasked with 
recruiting and energizing Bush supporters across their respective state and serving 
as messengers of the President’s agenda. John Sanchez, Regional Director of New 
Mexico’s “Viva Bush Coalition”, stated “we are going to work hard to make sure 
that Hispanics play a key role in delivering New Mexico to President Bush.”
78 
Advertisements on Spanish-language television were produced, as were voter 
registration drives orchestrated in New Mexico and California due to the large 
Latino population. On their Spanish-language website, Republicans posted an 
initiative called “Abriendo Caminos” (Forging New Paths), which served as the 
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party’s platform for publishing what they believed were President Bush’s efforts 
to aid Latinos. 
In June 2004 the Bush Administration unveiled rigorous measures intended to cut 
off the  flow of cash to Cuba; a policy aimed mainly at conservative Cuban 
Americans in Florida, who constitute a core bloc of voters. Critics often portended 
that the money exile Cubans send home to their families indirectly helps the 
regime of Fidel Castro. Now,  new restrictions limited trips to Havana and the 
flow of gifts and money send to relatives.  
Yet, Cuban Americans broadly opposed this measure. “Fidel Castro is not a good 
man, but I get very, very offended when someone tells me how to engage with my 
family,”
79 an exile Cuban said, indicating what many thought. “Indeed, 64 percent 
of younger Cuban Americans – those who arrived after 1985 or were born in the 
U.S.  – favor unrestricted travel between the U.S. and Cuba versus 32 percent of 
the old guard.”
80 
Even  though this measure did not bring the expected success others did and led to  
Bush victories in Democratic strongholds such as Cameron County in southern 
Texas, a largely Mexican American municipality. “Bush won it 50 to 49 percent. 
Al Gore had carried it  by nine percentage points in 2000, and Clinton by 29 
percentage points in 1996.”
81 Part of Republicans’ success in general and Bush’s 
in particular may be attributed to cultural conservatism among Catholic Latinos. 
Abortion constituted a major issue for Latinos why President Bush’s strong stand 
against abortion appealed to many Latinos, mirroring their family and social 
values. Thus, the Bush-Cheney reelection campaign managed to attract Latinos 
primarily on the basis of moral values and only circumstantially through political 
issues. Since Latino Republicans primarily identify as Americans maintaining 
traditional values of their home country this strategy was successful. Even though 
Latino Republicans are not 
more likely to believe that Latinos share a single culture or 
be acculturated in American society, they have nevertheless 
accepted, or agree with, the quintessential conservative 
American identity by again strongly identifying themselves 
as Americans and as Americans who believe in the sanctity 
of traditional family values and mores.
82 
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George W. Bush’s effort to attract support from Latinos dates back to his re-
election campaign as governor of Texas in 1998. His then-strategist Lionel Sosa 
explained what Bush had said to him: “Bush told me three things, I want to be the 
first Republican candidate for governor to win the Hispanic vote. I want 
Hispanics to know that they are part of this state. And I want this to be a model 
for the presidential campaign.”
83 
Bush started early to secure Latino support and often had to face opposition 
within his own party. Even though many Republicans, especially representatives 
of big businesses, endorse pro-immigration reforms, there is still remarkable 
resistance among party members. During the campaigns for the 2002 mid-term 
elections, several Republican candidates explicitly endorsed anti-immigration 
reforms aimed at illegal immigrants primarily from Mexico. Jon Kyl, a member of 
the Senate subcommittee on immigration, was a leading sponsor of the bill to ban 
racial quotas and preferences, and to develop federal control to track legal 
immigrants who outstay their visas. Elton Gallegly from California demanded a 
constitutional amendment to deny citizenship to the babies of illegal 
immigrants.
84 
Regarding this policy, portraying t hemselves as the party, who represents Latinos, 
seemed to be quite difficult for Republicans. Nevertheless, the Bush 
administration did manage to succeed among Latino voters in the elections of 
2000 and especially 2004. Significant reasons for Bush’s relative popularity 
among Latinos are shared values and mores such as family and religion. Family 
tends to have a much more important meaning among Latinos than for Anglo 
Americans. “From a values perspective, Latinos are also more traditionally 
religious and s ocially conservative than their White American counterparts.”
85 
This circumstance makes it important to analyze to what extent traditional Latino 
values have an impact on voting behavior. 
Figures released after the election document the central role religion played as a 
motivator for Latinos to vote for President Bush. In 2000, Latino Protestants made 
up 25 percent of the Latino vote, whereas four years later their share was up to 32 
percent. “In addition, this segment of the Latino electorate tilted more heavily for 
Bush in 2004, giving him 56 percent of their votes compared to 44 percent in 
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2000. Thus, Hispanic Protestants were both a growing and increasingly pro-
Republican constituency between the two elections.”
86 Latino Catholics’ support 
for Bush remained the same as in 2000 with 33 percent of their votes for the 
Republican candidate. By highlighting religion’s central role for his policy, 
President Bush managed to convince a considerable share of the Latino electorate 
to vote for him. His “No Child Left  Behind Act”
87 additionally stated that Latino 
issues are not only perceived by Republicans but also addressed . 
The longer Latinos live in the United States and adapt specific habits and patterns 
of life, the more likely they will loosen their traditional v alues. This can be 
observed with second and third generation Latinos, who are predominantly 
English speaking rather than Spanish, as are first generation immigrants. 
Acculturation also leads to the breakdown of family ties and social values. Yet, it 
is the subject of much dispute whether these circumstances benefit the Republican 
or the Democratic Party. If Latinos trust government in general and to provide 
promised services in particular, they are more likely to identify as Republicans. 
88 
 
 
 
4.2. Latinos and the Democratic Party 
In contrast to the Republican Party, Democrats dispose of a long tradition with 
racial minorities. Ties between the Democratic Party and Latinos date back to 
1960, with the organization of “Viva Kennedy Clubs”, which were originally 
partisan groups of Mexican Americans who supported the election of John F. 
Kennedy to the presidency. Besides that, voter registration and the organization of 
Latino voters were major concerns of the “Viva Kennedy Clubs”. Latinos 
supported Kennedy because the Democratic National Convention of 1960 
endorsed issues which were of great concern to them: civil rights, fair housing, 
school desegregation, equal opportunity, and voting rights. The Convention’s 
proposal included comprehensive legislation for migrant workers, the first such 
commitment by Democrats.  
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“The Viva Kennedy movement arose out of efforts by middle-class Mexican 
American leaders and organizations to gain more visible and effective 
participation in Democratic Party politics and that year’s presidential 
campaign.”
89 The Clubs were the first systematically organized effort to attract 
Latinos for the party and mainly spread throughout the southwest. They also 
united different national-origin groups as Latinos, thus presenting them as a 
significant constituency.  
In spite of this long tradition, Democrats have to work hard to secure Latino votes 
in the future. Although Latinos have traditionally voted at a ratio of 2:1 for the 
Democratic Party, they also share plenty of the values advocated by Republicans, 
such as family, religion, and opposition to abortion. Bill Richardson, Democratic 
Governor of New Mexico and bilingual son of a Mexican mother, admitted, “the 
problem with Democrats is that they take our people for granted.”
90 In 2003, the 
Democratic party held its first debate of candidates for president in New Mexico, 
where one third of voters are Latinos, outlining the significance of the Latino vote 
to Democrats to counteract these tendencies. Holding its first primary debate in a 
heavily Latino populated state was supposed to serve as an indicator of actions to 
come. However, the Kerry campaign and the  Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) lacked a national strategy for Latinos and neither spent enough money on 
advertising nor enough time campaigning in Hispanic communities. Furthermore 
Democrats failed to employ enough people to increase voter participation. 
Hispanic Outreach for the Democratic National Committee followed a strategy, 
built around the theme “Juntos Podemos” (Together We Can). With this strategy, 
Democrats hoped to expand their traditional support from Latinos. It included 
holding leadership summits to reach out to Latino leaders. On a summit in May 
2004 in Orlando, Florida, John Kerry came together with Democratic Latino 
elected officials and party activists. It was supposed to send out the message that 
Latinos back Kerry and strongly support his candidacy. But whereas the 
Republicans followed a national strategy with its “Viva Bush Coalitions”,  
designed from the example of the “Viva Kennedy Clubs”, John Kerry’s campaign 
team lacked such a tactic. The Kerry campaign mistakenly assumed Latinos 
would be part of their base vote, while this fast-growing community is 
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increasingly a swing voter group. “The growing Latino electorate has 
demonstrated its willingness to cross party lines and vote more independently for 
candidates who appeal for reasons other than party affiliations.”
91 
Tony Welch, a spokesman for the Democratic National Committee, said the DNC 
had its most extensive outreach to L atinos in its history in 2004. Nevertheless, 
John Kerry only gained around 58 percent of their votes,
92 representing a 4 
percent decrease in comparison to 2000. Welch added, “as we saw in the election 
results, Democrats are going to have to work even harder for Hispanic voters 
because they are a key part of any winning Democratic formula.”
93 
 
Independent groups such as the  New Democrat Network (NDN),  MoveOn.org, 
People for the American Way and the National Council of La Raza that were 
critical of President George W. Bush’s policies, spent millions on Spanish-
language TV and radio ads, in order to attract Latinos for the Democratic Party. 
NDN engaged significantly in this effort, launching Spanish-language television 
commercials in various states, featuring five Latino politicians explaining what it 
means to them to be Democratic leaders. The message that, under Democrats 
Latinos will “have a better life”, was supposed to rally Latinos behind Democrats. 
The commercials, a 30-second spot and a 60-second spot, featured testimonials by 
Representative Bob Menendez of New Jersey, Representative Loretta Sanchez of 
California, Raul Martinez, mayor of Hialeah, Florida, Adolfo Carrion, county 
executive of the Bronx borough in New York City, and New Mexico Governor 
Bill Richardson. 
The Democratic Party itself, though, failed to adequately address Latino voters 
and their concerns. Despite support of independent groups, Democrats did not 
succeed in increasing their lead among Latinos. This appears to be dwindling 
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even more considering policy issues Latinos ranked extremely important. 
Education (54 %), Economy and Jobs and Health Care and Medicare (both 51 %) 
were ranked the first three priorities of Latinos in determining their vote for 
president in 2004.
94 All of these three i ssues are considered to be core 
competences of the Democratic Party, who stand for a larger government, 
providing the people with basic social services. Although John Kerry consistently 
promised during his campaign to raise the minimum wage to $7 an hour a nd 
pledged to sign legislation to provide immigrants with a path to citizenship, he 
was not able to rally more Latinos behind him than Al Gore in 2000. 
With the “No Child Left Behind Act” President Bush obviously managed to 
challenge a former field of Democratic domination. Republicans’ success among 
Latinos was significant enough to bring about a warning to Democratic Party 
officials by leaders of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC)
95, who said 
there has been a “continuing pattern of neglect” of the nation's fastest-growing 
minority group by the party. “Republicans have been committed, methodical and 
are clearly winning the battle for the Hispanic voters. If Democrats do not 
undertake a major paradigm shift in how they deal with the Latino vote, the future 
of the party is in serious jeopardy,”
96 caucus leaders wrote. 
This assessment corresponds with findings of the National Association of Latino 
Elected Officials (NALEO) published in June 2004:  
Traditionally, political observers and academics have 
characterized the Latino electorate as Democratic leaning. 
However, high rates of naturalization, the aging of Latino 
youth into adults, and the increase in outreach by 
Republicans in the Latino community, have made the 
Latino vote less predictable.
97  
 
Even though Latinos are recognized by both major parties as an important 
constituency, many voters feel that leading politicians do not adequately address 
their interests. “In Houston, voters expressed a level of frustration with 
campaigns, citing their perception t hat candidates see Latino voters as numbers 
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and not with a sincere interest in their progress.”
98 Both major parties need to 
work on this perception mediating Latinos that they are willing to struggle for 
their needs. Otherwise, it is likely that Latinos rather stay away from the polls 
instead of voting for either party.   
 
 
 
 
5. Political Activity other than voting 
 
Besides understanding Latino participation in electoral politics, it is essential to 
examine Latino engagement in unconventional activities in  order to allow for the 
high numbers of unregistered and illegal Latino immigrants living in the United 
States.  For them, political acts other than voting represent the only possibilities to 
lobby for specific demands and change their present status, thus  allowing for 
unrestricted engagement in U.S. politics.  
“The history of such organizing dates back to when Mexicans were first denied 
access to political process as Anglos became the dominant population in the 
Southwest.”
99 In 1898, after the Mexican-American War, thousands of Mexicans 
became U.S. citizens but faced overt discrimination and prejudicial attitudes that 
resulted in the limitation of their civil rights and opportunities to work. To counter 
these developments, organizations were founded which, unfortunately, were too 
small and ineffective to secure Mexican Americans’ civil rights. With the 
establishment of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) in 1929 
Mexicans and other Latinos living in the United States received their first 
organization strong enough to advocate for their demands. Other Latino 
organizations were to follow, constituting a vital force for political education and 
advocating the interests of more than 40 million people living in the United 
States.  
The 2004 National Survey of Latinos conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center and 
Kaiser Family Foundation found that non-electoral political activity is mainly 
exercised by citizens who are registered. Latino non-citizens engage in 
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significantly lower numbers than do citizens. There is also a difference between 
registered and non-registered Latinos.
100 Activities such as attending a public 
meeting or demonstration, contacting an elected official, money contributions to a 
political campaign, and attending a party meeting are the most common actions 
undertaken by Latinos.  
Flamboyant in this context are low participation rates of non-citizen Latinos in 
comparison to their citizen and registered counterparts. As it is expected that non-
electoral activities are exceedingly attractive to  non-citizens since they represent 
the only way to engage politically, they are only marginally used. Latino non-
citizens engage in much larger numbers in church or religious groups and school 
or tutoring programs,
101 thereby demonstrating a distinct concern  for their 
immediate surrounding over local or state politics.  
In their work Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics Verba 
et al. identify several political acts other than voting, 
including working in and contributing to electoral 
campaigns and organizations; contacting government 
officials; attending protests, marches, or demonstrations; 
working informally with others to solve some community 
problem; serving without pay on local elected and 
appointed boards; being active politically through the 
intermediation of voluntary associations; and contributing 
money to political causes in response to mail 
solicitations.
102  
 
In the case of financial contributions federal law restrains non-citizen activities. 
“Recent congressional hearings pointed  out that federal law prohibits campaign 
contributions by foreign nationals to federal campaigns, although permanent 
residents of the United States may contribute money.”
103 Admittedly, campaign 
contributions are of secondary importance in political acts by L atinos; therefore, 
this limitation only slightly affects them. 
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Table 4: Political Activities by Race (percent active)    
                 
Activity     Anglo  African     Latino 
      Whites  Americans  Latinos  Citizens 
Vote     73  65  41  52 
Campaign Work  8  12  7  8 
Campaign Contributions  25  22  11  12 
Contact     37  24  14  17 
Protest     5  9  4  4 
Informal Community Activity  17  19  12  14 
Board Membership  4  2  4  5 
Affiliated with a Political  52  38  24  27 
Organization             
Source: Verba, Sidney/Lehman Schlozman, Kay/Brady, Henry E.: Voice and Equality - Civic 
Voluntarism in American Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 3rd Ed., 2001; 233. 
 
The aforementioned acts differ in a variety of ways, including requirements 
necessary to execute them. All of the aforementioned forms of political 
participation necessitate certain quantities of time, money, and skills.
104 For 
instance, serving without pay in an elected position or contributing money to a 
political campaign or organization requires a stable financial basis, which allows 
for this action. Attending marches or demonstrations and being active in an 
organization primarily requires time to do so, additionally presupposing the will 
to dedicate it for a cause, which seems to be worth it. In this context, required 
skills  are primarily a distinct political consciousness and the intellectual ability to 
know how and where to be active. Any political participation  – including voting  – 
demands certain knowledge of the political system and possibilities for an 
individual to be active within this system.  
In the case of non-citizen Latinos, this knowledge often is not given, accompanied 
by the lack of sufficient money and time resources. Many non-citizen Latinos are 
illegal immigrants and additionally lack sufficient English proficiency. Their time 
is confined due to long working days, which  – in many cases  – may last up to 
sixteen hours a day. Fear of being discovered as illegal immigrants when having 
contact with officials further restrains many from becoming politically active. 
Therefore, non-citizen Latinos only restrictively exercise participation other than 
voting, while registered Latinos may fully engage in non-electoral politics. In 
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comparison to Anglo and African Americans, Latino participation in general is 
distinctively lower based upon voting turnout. 
Despite arguments that unconventional politics is a tool for 
groups that want to challenge the political establishment 
and who feel the need to go beyond conventional politics to 
make their views known, Latinos were shown t o be an 
exceptional case in that they are less likely to protest 
relative to their non-Latino counterparts.
105 
 
There are also differences in activity rates among Latinos: “Latinos of Mexican 
and Puerto Rican descent are more likely to protest than their Cuban 
counterparts.”
106 These findings are contradictory to theoretical approaches, 
which emphasize that individuals with a greater share of resources are more likely 
to be politically active.  Since generally, Cubans dispose of a higher educational 
level and b etter economic conditions than do Mexican Americans and Puerto 
Ricans, the findings are astonishing. Yet, the following explanation seems to be 
plausible.  
The ethnicity gap in protest may be attributed to the fact 
that, because of their different migration and settlement 
experiences, Cubans are better situated to take advantage of 
individual and community resources so that they need not 
resort to unconventional political tactics to bring about 
change. In other words, Cubans may not be as politically 
disenfranchised as Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, making 
protest unnecessary.
107   
 
Disparities between Anglo Americans and Latinos also exist in organizational 
involvement. “[…] Latinos as a group, belong to fewer organizations than their 
Anglo counterparts. As a matter of fact, more than two out of five Latinos (42.9 
percent) do not belong to any organization.”
108 However, in the history of Latino 
politics in the United States organizations and civil rights groups played a 
significant role in developing a common agenda and shaping Latino political 
consciousness.  
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5.1. Latino Civil Rights and Interest Groups  
Nongovernmental organizations provide non-citizens and recently arrived 
immigrants with the opportunity to exercise political activism, since they usually 
set a side citizenship requirements. Civil rights groups and church organizations 
provide Latinos with the possibility to act politically within the United States for 
the first time constituting a significant step in civic engagement for a segment of 
the immigrant population. Latinos are enabled to participate in community affairs 
and are familiarized with the U.S. political system. By this means undocumented 
immigrants may loose the fear of taking part in American society and their “role 
and value as contributing members of barrios and community and labor 
organizations”
109 is acknowledged.   
 
As mentioned before, the  League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) 
was the first Latino organization dedicated to  advancing the economic condition, 
educational attainment, political influence, and civil rights of the Latino  – then 
mostly Mexican  – population in the United States. Today it is not only the oldest, 
but it is the biggest Latino organization in the United States, claiming to have 
approximately 115,000 members.
110 Starting out as a civil rights organization in 
1929, today  LULAC is influential in lobbying for Latino interests on a nationwide 
level, maintaining its national office in Washington D.C.  
By holding town hall meetings throughout the country,  LULAC strives for the 
inclusion of its base in recognizing the issues that are of most concern. In this 
way, it follows that  LULAC addresses issues that are important to Latinos 
throughout the country. In 2005  LULAC heavily opposed plans to privatise parts 
of the social security system,  since Latinos rely more heavily on the present 
system than any other group. In addition to economic issues,  LULAC 
continuously holds voter registration drives and offers information and 
consultation regarding the U.S. political system, thus being an important actor in 
political education.   
In 1968, the Mexican American Legal Defence and Education Fund (MALDEF) 
was established, having emerged from  LULAC and the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Unlike t he name suggests, this 
organization does not primarily target Mexican Americans but Latinos in general. 
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In contrast to  LULAC,  MALDEF focuses on legal support for Latinos by 
employing attorneys who offer judicial advice and assistance. “ MALDEF works 
to secure and safeguard the rights of Latinos by focusing on employment, 
education, immigrants’ rights, political access, and public resource equity.”
111 
 MALDEF’s most significant accomplishment was the case Plyler v. Doe in 1982, 
which focused on a move by the Texas legislature in 1975 “to exclude the 
children of undocumented immigrants from public schools by amending the 
education code to restrict public schools to ‘citizens of the United States or legally 
admitted aliens’.”
112  MALDEF filed a lawsuit against this m easure eventually 
being justified by the Supreme Court in 1982. This decision marked an important 
success for  MALDEF, making it the most significant civil rights advocacy group 
for Latinos. 
After September 11, 2001 and the resulting stricter laws and measures for the 
defense of terrorist attacks,  MALDEF has mainly engaged in immigration law and 
civil liberty struggles. When President Bush proposed his immigration reform 
plan in 2003,  MALDEF released information on the plan in order to provide 
Latinos with n ecessary background knowledge. After the 2004 presidential 
election MALDEF challenged “Arizona’s Proposition 200, a measure that would 
prevent undocumented immigrants from receiving government services. 
MALDEF won a temporary restraining order in federal court against the state,”
113 
thus demonstrating once again its abilities regarding legal affairs and importance 
of the protection of Latino civil rights. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned organizations, there are several more civil rights 
groups who are of great importance to Latino politics. The National Council of La 
Raza (NCLR), founded in 1968, belongs to the largest and most influential civil 
rights groups in the United States. As a community based organization it oversees  
almost 300 local groups all over the country, fighting to give the average Latino a 
chance to voice his concerns. The  Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education 
Fund (PRLDEF) was originally founded in 1972 as a civil rights group addressing 
specifically Puerto Rican issues. Over the years, however, it broadened its 
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approach to include all Latinos, thus becoming more influential. With increasing 
success in elections the  National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed 
Officials (NALEO) was founded in 1981. It strives to empower Latinos to actively 
engage in the political process and promote the integration of Latino immigrants. 
Furthermore, it provides assistance and training to elected officials. 
There are many more civil rights organizations engaging in the empowerment of 
Latinos on l ocal, state, and nationwide levels. They all serve as agents of Latino 
citizens as well as non-citizens. Due to many grassroots organizations, a base 
oriented policy agenda is possible. However, because of the multiplicity of agents, 
they mostly do not lobby concertedly, owing to the circumstance that Latino 
issues are exceedingly diverse. A Puerto Rican factory worker in New York City 
prioritizes differently than a Cuban businessman in Miami. 
Despite these distinctions, Latino civil rights and interest groups represent a 
fundamental part of Latino political engagement in the United States. They offer 
the feasibility of political engagement for non-citizens who make up a large part 
of the Latino population. Moreover, they provide political education by offering 
courses and consulting services, and assist in legal questions like those in the case 
of  MALDEF. They are much closer to the Latino population due to their 
organizational structure and their goals than are the two major parties, making 
them important m ediators between the political establishment and Latinos. In 
light of these factors, Latino civil rights and interest groups are important in the 
making and execution of Latino politics. 
 
 
 
 
II The diverse Minority 
 
What is widely called the Latino population is a part of American society 
consisting of more than twenty national-origin groups. A criterion for the 
subsumption under one label was the common Spanish language. Obviously, 
these nationalities differ, not only when considered in their home countries but 
also when they come to the United States. Perception by other U.S. citizens and 
opportunities for Latinos in the United States greatly depend on their nationality                                                                                                                  
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and socioeconomic status. The latter may vary extensively among the three largest 
national-origin groups. When we talk about Mexican Americans, Cuban 
Americans, and Puerto Ricans one has to remember that these ethnic groups come 
from differential historical backgrounds and face unequal judicial barriers. 
In this context, “an ethnic group is the reference group with whom people share a 
common history, physical features, and culture, and it is through interaction with 
reference group members that people identify themselves as members of a given 
group and incorporate an ethnic identity.”
114 But even within an ethnic group, 
differences exist that not only affect cultural behavior but political participation as 
well. 
 
Table 5: Socioeconomic Status of Latinos (percent)       
                    
      White             
      Non-        Puerto     
      Hispanic  Hispanic  Mexican  Rican  Cuban 
Full-time year-round   49.3  23.3  20.6  29.6  34.4 
workers with annual                 
earnings of $35,000                 
or more                   
                    
Below poverty line  7.7  22.8  24.1  25.8  17.3 
                    
With at least high school  88.4  57.0  51.0  64.3  73.0 
Education                   
Source: Therrien, Melissa/ Ramirez, Roberto R.: Current Population Reports, P20-535, U.S. Census 
Bureau, Washington D.C., 2000 in: Castro, Max J.: The New Cuban Immigration in Context, 
North-South Center University of Miami, Miami, No.58, 2002; 12. 
     
In the following the three largest Latino ethnic groups’ specific historical 
backgrounds and experiences in the United States will be examined. By doing so 
their political participation and interests will be  analyzed. Whereas in the first part 
of this work, the emphasis was laid on the Latino population as a whole, this part 
now goes into more detail and proves the assertion that Latinos constitute a highly 
diverse minority.  The following case of the three national-origin groups was not 
only chosen because they constitute the biggest ethnicities among Latinos; they 
                                                 
114 Flores Niemann, Yolanda/ Romero, Andrea J./ Arredondo, Jorge/ Rodriguez, Victor:  What 
does it mean to be ‘Mexican’? Social Construction of an Ethnic Identity, Hispanic Journal of 
Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 21 No 1, February 1999, p. 47-60; 47.                                                                                                                  
  46
also serve as good examples of the range of possibilities  available to Latinos and 
their varying political intentions. 
 
 
 
 
6. Mexican Americans 
 
Not only is the Mexican-origin population consistently the largest of the Latino 
subgroups, constituting 63 percent of the Latino population, it also disposes of the 
longest tradition on U.S. soil. Only Mexicans can claim to be both early settlers in 
the United States and the largest group of new arrivals. The history of Mexican-
origin people in the territory what now belongs to the United States reaches back 
several hundred years. Mexican politics in the United States date back to 1821, 
when Mexico obtained independence from Spain. Back then Mexicans changed 
the governmental structure, established by the Spanish occupiers, and governed 
themselves in large parts of Texas and California. Accordingly, Mexicans may be 
regarded as pioneers of Latino politics in t he United States and it is this specific 
role that shapes Mexican American political engagement.  
 
 
 
6.1. Historical Background 
When the Mexican-American War was officially ended in 1848, Mexico lost 
almost half of its national territory to the United States. The Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo
115  provided that Mexico cede New Mexico and California and recognize 
the Rio Grande as the boundary of Texas. The United States paid Mexico fifteen 
million dollars for California and New Mexico and assumed any claims of 
American citizens against Mexico.  
The war with Mexico and the  Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo were logical 
consequences of what John L. O’Sullivan in 1839 and again in 1845 called 
“Manifest Destiny”. He was convinced that the United States had “the right… to 
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overspread and to possess the whole of the [American] continent which 
Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty 
and federated self-government entrusted to us.”
116 
In adding Texas, California, and New Mexico to its territory, the United States 
absorbed the people living in these areas as well. “[T]he Mexicans who decided to 
remain in the United States became U.S. citizens, and those who held public 
office continued to serve where they were allowed to do so.”
117 Thus, Mexicans 
legally belong to United States society for more than 150 years, shaping its 
culture by adding their fashions and language. Since then Mexican Americans 
have participated, more or less, politically. Only members of the educated and 
landowner classes, however, held political positions and were running for and 
elected to office. Through adjustment to the U.S. government and alliances with 
those in power they were mostly able to secure their positions and influence. 
 
In the territories of New Mexico and Arizona and the states 
of Texas, California, and Colorado there were numerous 
Mexican American elected officials, including city and 
county officials, district judges, and marshals, who 
accommodated themselves to the Anglo power structure. 
As the Anglo population grew with continued migration 
into the region, the Mexican community’s influence 
declined everywhere in the Southwest except for New 
Mexico.
118 
 
As long as Mexicans were the majority, they were able to influence local politics. 
Yet, the continued migration of Anglos caused increasing oppression of Mexican 
Americans in every day life, including political activity. In California and Texas, 
where there did not exist an upper class of Mexicans as was the case in New 
Mexico, the Spanish-speaking population struggled hard to make their voices 
heard. No Mexican held statewide office, instead they were active in local 
positions, mostly in areas where there still existed a majority of Mexicans. 
The Mexican Revolution (1910-20) greatly increased the numbers of Mexicans in 
the United States, although it did not increase their political influence. Restrictive 
political practices such as the poll tax
119 limited Mexican American political 
participation, as did the fact that many did not hold U.S. citizenship. Until World 
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War II Mexican American politics occurred almost exclusively on a local level, 
manifesting in mutual aid associations and civil rights groups. With modified 
conditions after the war, Mexican American expectations and actions changed. 
 
 
 
6.2. Mexican Politics and the Chicano Movement 
After World War II, Latino politics, especially Mexican American, proceeded in 
an entirely new context. Thousands of Mexican Americans had fought in the U.S. 
Army, contributing to the worldwide fight against fascism and for democracy. 
Fighting side by side with Anglo Americans overseas and being treated equally  
gave Mexican Americans hope for improved possibilities at home. Yet, not much 
changed for Mexican Americans after the war. They still faced the same obstacles 
as before, though now they were ready to actively fight for their rights. Due to 
their much more developed political consciousness, injustices and discrimination 
at home were responded to by the founding of civil rights organizations. 
As millions of veterans returned home, many counted on the G.I. Bill of Rights, 
which guaranteed educational, medical, housing and other basic benefits. But 
these benefits were being denied in large part to Americans of Mexican descent 
and other Latinos throughout the United States. When Mexican Americans 
returned to the United States they worked in low-wage jobs and had to live in 
segregated housing. They predominantly populated the Southwest and Midwest, 
where their labor was required in the postwar economic boom. In 1948 a group of  
Mexican American war veterans founded the America G.I. Forum in order to 
enforce their rights. The Forum was dedicated to combat discrimination and 
improve the status of Mexican Americans in Texas. 
“By 1949, the G.I. Forum had established over 100 forums in Texas. Although it 
was officially nonpartisan, the organization’s members were encouraged to 
participate in politics.”
120 During the 1950’s, when McCarthyism and the 
anticommunist hysteria intimidated many critics, the Forum used its military 
background and the veteran status of its members to struggle against charges that 
the organization would advocate leftist programs. The Forum’s efforts laid the 
foundation for what came to be known the Chicano Movement in the 1960s. 
                                                 
120 Geron, 37.                                                                                                                  
  49
Efforts were intensified to elect Mexican Americans to city councils, including 
electoral campaigns catered to Latinos, especially Mexicans.  
There were efforts that directly challenged the two-party 
political system and capitalism. There were numerous 
nontraditional organizing projects in various parts of the 
Southwest that changed the image of Mexican Americans 
in society and raised Chicanos’ expectations about their 
right and ability to achieve sweeping political changes.
121 
 
Two efforts, one in the electoral arena, the other in the field of worker rights, 
became symbols for the Chicano Movement. Efforts to improve working 
conditions and wages for Latinos and the founding of a specific Latino party were 
the most significant pushes towards equal rights and the perception of Latinos as 
an important political constituency. 
 
 
 
6.2.1. La Raza Unida Party 
The idea of founding a Chicano Party originated from a congress held by the 
Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO), which was formed in 1967 by a 
group of student activists in San Antonio.  MAYO worked on the improvement of 
political education for Chicanos and campaigned for Mexican American political 
representation in Texas. After several successful actions to reach their goals, 
organizers decided to found a Chicano party. 
In 1970, establishing La Raza Unida Party (LRUP) was supposed to draw Latino, 
especially Chicano, voters from the two major parties and unite them in an 
independent third party, giving Latinos a voice nationwide. Led by José Angel 
Gutiérrez, some 300 Chicanos organized La Raza Unida. The party's name came 
from a phrase coined by Juan Nepomuceno Cortina in 1848, which meant “the 
United People”. Raza in this context, however, has a slightly different denotation 
than the English word “race”.  
What the Chicanos imagined was an amalgam of Spanish, 
Aztec, and other cultural strains that have gone into the 
making of people like them, reflected more in their spirits 
or ways of thinking than in their genes. A person did not 
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have to be brown-skinned to be part of the raza as long as 
his or her mentality was Chicano.
122 
 
First, the party had to campaign on the local level and won a majority of the 
school board and city council of Crystal City, Texas, where Anglos were a  
minority but had always dominated these institutions. Besides Crystal City  La 
Raza Unida Party managed to win seats of county and school boards in other 
towns of Texas and other states. In California, Colorado, New Mexico, and 
Arizona committees were formed,  providing for a strong basis for  LRUP in the 
Southwest. However,  
efforts  to build it into a significant political force outside 
the Río Grande Valley, especially in the more urban areas 
of California, made little headway. Although campaigning 
strenuously for its candidate for the California state 
assembly, the party got only 7 percent of the vote in its best 
year, 1971.
123  
 
The party did not manage to grow significantly for the most part because it 
competed with the better equipped and organized Democratic Party for voters and 
fought internal battles over the strategies and tactics for building the movement. 
Although  LRUP was founded as a political party, it was not adequately organized 
or funded to challenge the two party system. In Texas and some areas of 
California it functioned as a party, nominating candidates for elective office. In 
other parts of the Southwest, however, it was more like a civil rights group, 
mobilizing Chicanos to register and vote. Besides the lack of unified political 
strategy, other internal factors contributed to the failure of LRUP.  
The main reason was division of support for  LRUP. Some leaders followed a 
radical strategy whereby Anglo Americans were to be considered an enemy who 
had to be fought. This faction consisted of some radicals and was widely 
supported by younger members. Older generations, in  contrast, generally 
supported a more liberal strategy, mobilizing as many people as possible for their 
cause, in order to increase their influence as a political party. 
Restrictive electoral structures in the United States, such as the winner-takes-it-all 
system
124, additionally contributed to  LRUP’s eventual demise in 1981.  La Raza 
Unida did not manage to raise sufficient money to fund campaigns and send its 
                                                 
122 Fox, 122. 
123 Fox, 122. 
124 See Fn. 15, 9.                                                                                                                  
  51
political message out to the people. The Democratic Party, from which they 
mainly sought to attract v oters, was far better equipped and structured. Despite  
short-lived political success,  LRUP “set the foundation for subsequent political 
efforts and organizational development”
125 among Mexican Americans in 
particular and Latinos in general. “The Raza Unida  Party inspired a whole 
generation of Mexican Americans to participate in the electoral process on a scale 
never before attempted.”
126   
 
Besides efforts to build a strong political party Mexican Americans were also 
active outside the electoral arena. The 1960’s marked a turning point in Mexican 
American politics generating charismatic leaders such as César Chávez, who 
fought for the poorest of Mexican workers. 
 
 
 
6.2.2. César Chávez and the United Farm Workers Union 
César Chávez was one of many thousand Mexican Americans who fought in the 
U.S. Army during World War II. After his return he became a farm worker, 
picking fruits and vegetables and began to engage with the  Community Service 
Organization (CSO), a prominent Latino civil rights group. In 1962, Chávez  left 
CSO to found the labor union National Farm Workers Association (NFA). He was 
“one of the first to recognize the new opportunities and limits and to craft new 
strategies to seize them.”
127 Although Chávez was aware of earlier failed attempts 
to found labor organizations, he organized the poorest Mexican-American 
workers. The NFA was soon renamed in United Farm Workers Union (UFW). 
In 1965, the organization called its first strike, in an effort to improve working 
conditions and labor rights of Filipino field workers in California. For several 
reasons,  La Huelga
128, the organization’s first strike, was fundamentally different 
from previous ones. 
First, it was not directed at a single employer or set of demands, hence it never 
really ended. “ La Huelga was more of a prolonged social movement to change a 
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whole series of conditions, and then to change some more.”
129 Secondly, Chávez 
insisted on nonviolence, thus breaking with Mexican American labor tradition. He 
urged the workers to stay calm and under no circumstance to fight back, even 
when they were physically attacked by growers’ agents or the growers 
themselves. Attacks occurred quite frequently, in attempts to intimidate the 
workers and break their will to organize. 
Chávez also was able to touch the consciousness of the American public. He did 
so by involving as many people as possible into the union’s project, including 
students, priests, and ministers. By doing so the whole country was acquainted 
with Chávez’s cause and a plurality supported him. All of the above-mentioned 
measures worked together to secure public support. 
 Their nonviolence made the farm workers appear more 
sympathetic, if not simply pathetic, and the aggressions of 
growers and local police especially grotesque. It also made 
the movement seem a  close parallel to that section of the 
black civil rights movement led by Dr. Martin Luther King 
Jr., which had already won support from liberal white 
Americans across the country.
130 
 
In the course of the strike, the union convinced several growers in California to 
sign contracts with their employers and forced the state of California to pass the 
Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA). The act secured farm workers in 
California the same rights industrial workers enjoyed nationwide under the 
National Labor R elations Act (NLRA)
131. Previously, growers had pressured the 
state government to exclude agricultural workers from the NLRA, thus denying 
workers any guarantees of the right to organize or to strike.  
In 1968, backed by his previous success, Chávez launched a nationwide grape 
boycott, demanding consumers not to buy any grapes from California until the 
workers were adequately paid and their working conditions improved. Again, the 
union’s cause was widely recognized and received strong support all over the 
country. “Chávez viewed the struggle  – which he and his followers called  La 
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causa, ‘the cause’ – as more than a labor dispute. It was a statement of the equal 
worth of Hispanics as human beings.”
132  
The achievements of  UFW and Chávez exceeded the mere improvement of 
working conditions and labor rights originally sought. It marked the beginning of 
political awareness of Mexican Americans as a political entity in the postwar 
United States.  
From this point forward, in part because of César Chávez’s 
strategic discoveries and in larger part because of the 
structural changes that had made his movement possible, 
the history of Mexican American political consciousness 
ceases to be a separate story from that of other protesting 
groups in the United States. And it was about this time, the 
late 1960s and afterward, that Mexican Americans began to 
get interested in the histories not only of their own 
ancestors but of the other Spanish-speaking groups as well, 
because in order to take maximum advantage of the new 
economic, p olitical, and technological conditions in this 
country, they were going to have to work together.
133 
 
The movement established effective coalitions with other sectors of society 
generating a public awareness that went far beyond one’s own industrial or ethnic 
group. Additionally, it served as a role model for the Mexican American and other 
ethnic communities in actively engaging in U.S. politics. 
 
 
 
6.3. In-Group Conflict 
With regard to the long history of Mexicans in the United States, this national-
origin g roup is probably the most diverse among Latinos. Some have lived on 
U.S. soil for generations, tracing their roots back to the 1820s when large parts of 
Texas and California still belonged to Mexico. Others, in turn, are recent 
immigrants, crossing the U.S.–Mexican border legally or illegally to find work in 
the wealthier north. 
Therefore, the term  Mexican American might not be adequate to define people of 
Mexican ancestry living in the United States. In fact, there are a variety of terms 
used either by Mexicans themselves or other parts of society. The original 
Mexican settlers in California are known as  Californios, and some still use this 
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term. They “governed what was called Alta California before it became a state [of 
the United States] in 1850.”
134 The term  Tejano originates from Mexicans who 
lived in Texas before it became part of the United States. By using this label 
Mexicans proudly refer to the fact that they lived in the territory before Anglo 
Americans settled there.  
Chicano was an epithet that Mexican Americans had long 
used among themselves, at least since the 1920s. It may 
have started out as an abbreviation of  mexicano, which 
some Mexicans pronounced as ‘meh-shi-ca-no’. Or it may 
have started as a playful extension of  chico, colloquial for 
‘boy’ or ‘buddy’.
135  
 
These days, Chicano is primarily used by the second generation or those who are 
from several generations of family born in the United States, to emphasize their 
strong ethnic consciousness of being Mexican American.  Chicanos are proud of 
their heritage, but also assimilate into American society and adapt to the country’s 
culture. 
Finally, government authorities, academic literature or other races generally use 
the terms Mexican and Mexican American. However, Mexican Americans use this 
term a s well, to concurrently emphasize their heritage and pride of being 
American. After considering this variety of terms for people tracing their roots to 
Mexico, the diversity of this national-origin group becomes apparent. 
 
Due to this heterogeneity, it may be assumed that it is rather unlikely that there 
are many issues the Mexican American population agrees on.  In fact, the 
“Emergency Labor Program” eventually known as the “Bracero Program”
136 
became an issue where diverse Mexican interests collided. Under  pressure from 
large agricultural farmers, who lacked workers during World War II, the U.S. 
government started this official program in 1942, legally sanctioning seasonal 
workers from Mexico in the United States. “As many as 100,000 Mexicans a year 
were soon being contracted to work here.”
137 Until its end in 1964, millions of 
migrants came to the United States for seasonal work and each year many found a 
way to stay in the country. “Not that most Americans cared. Until the 1960s, few 
paid attention to the human traffic along the border, least of all the inhabitants of 
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the area, for whom the international demarcation line was more a fantasy of the 
politicians in Washington than an everyday reality.”
138 New farming techniques 
and growing opposition by organized labor and Chicano groups ended the 
program. Especially the United Farm Workers Union (UFW) with its founder and 
leader César Chávez successfully protested against the exploitation and 
discrimination of Mexican farm workers.  
From the perspective of farm workers already living in the United States the 
program undercut their wages and weakened working conditions. Mexicans 
crossing the border, on the other hand, regarded this as an opportunity to earn 
good money to send home. They were able to earn a multiple amount of what they 
would earn in Mexico and additionally saw a chance to remain in the United 
States indefinitely. 
The “Bracero Program” served as one catalyst for inner-Mexican American 
disputes, however, it was not the only one. Latino interest groups, such as LULAC 
and the  American G.I. Forum, long had lobbied for restricted immigration from 
Mexico, claiming that the mass of new arrivals would “undermine the social and 
economic position of Mexican Americans struggling into the American 
mainstream.”
139 
Today’s Latino leaders take a more favorable stand towards immigration, 
although, the Mexican American population is still somewhat divided. Conflict 
potential exists between Mexicans, recent immigrants, and Chicanos. In a survey 
on Mexican identity, Mexicans r eported “some Chicanas/Chicanos call them 
‘wetbacks’
140, pretend not to speak or understand Spanish, and generally treat 
them worse than do Anglo-Americans in many situations.”
141 By virtue of the 
discrimination “from our own kind” Mexicans were stunned, not u nderstanding 
how such differences can occur among the same ethnicity. 
Nevertheless, reasons for this behavior are quite understandable. As more and 
more Mexican immigrants poured into the United States, they competed with 
other Latinos for resources such a s jobs. Especially the low-skilled sector was, 
and still is, heavily contested by Latinos due to low education levels and language 
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problems. “Chicanas/Chicanos often express the belief that Mexican immigrants 
are keeping them from advancing, and they often blame negative stereotypes on 
these immigrants.”
142 Besides any stereotypes and negative images of immigrants, 
facts show that there are still differences in income between the native- and 
foreign-born. 
A study found that Mexican Immigrants earn less than t heir counterparts who 
were born in the United States.
143 This is mainly due to work experience the 
native-born have obtained in the United States. Even though “education, 
occupation, and metropolitan location have a large and significant positive effect 
on t he earnings of native-born Mexican men […] they do not provide any 
particular advantage for immigrants.”
144 In their case it is the work experience 
they gained in the United States widely leaving aside other factors. 
Considering these circumstances, the hard-fought contest among native and 
foreign-born Mexicans for the improvement of their economic situation seems to 
be understandable. Ethnic ties play a subordinate role when it comes to securing 
not only their personal but also societal standing. Attitudes t owards recent 
immigrants, however, not only changed among Latino leaders but the Latino 
population as a whole. In 2004, 60 percent of Latinos believed that undocumented 
or illegal immigrants would help the economy and 46 percent thought that the 
U.S. government should allow the same number of Latino immigrants in the 
future.
145 
 
 
 
6.4. Mexican Americans Today 
Today, Mexican Americans take a more unified stand than they did before and 
shortly after the war, in order to successfully fight for their interests. Y et, they are 
still far from acting as a corporate entity. Over the last years four issues became of 
particular interest for Mexican Americans reflecting recent legislation and their 
life situation in the United States. Citizenship status, immigration, social security 
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benefits, and remittances are of major concern and notably affect them in 
everyday life.   
Mexican American registered voters make up 60 percent of the Latino 
electorate
146, constituting a significant part of the electorate as a whole. Even 
though it is estimated that every fourth Mexican American is an illegal 
immigrant,
147 thus not holding U.S. citizenship and the right to vote, political 
awareness and participation are high. In areas of heavy Mexican American 
concentration, they almost cohesively support Latino candidates or push for legal 
and societal improvements. In Los Angeles, Mexican American Antonio R. 
Villaraigosa was elected mayor in 2005, backed by strong support of Mexican 
Americans. To do so, however, it is necessary to hold U.S. citizenship. Though, 
the vast majority of Mexican immigrants between the 1960s and 1980s did not 
bother applying for U.S. citizenship, this now has changed. Due to more 
restrictive labor conditions and immigration laws, the majority of Mexican 
immigrants now are poised to seek citizenship.  
Due to the high percentage of legal and illegal immigrants coming every year 
from Mexico to the United States, immigration is one of the most important issues 
to Mexican Americans. Hundreds of thousands cross the border every year and 
most find a job in a Mexican dominated neighborhood. The numbers increased 
dramatically in the past decades. “Between 1960 and 1970, [the Mexican] 
population grew by only 32 percent, but between 1970 and 1980 it nearly tripled 
in size, experiencing a 189 percent increase. Between 1980 and 1990, the 
population more than doubled, increasing by 114 percent.”
148 
Even more try to enter the United States but get caught by government authorities 
and are sent back. Still, many Mexicans try repeatedly to immigrate until they 
manage to cross the border successfully. Hence, Mexican Americans closely 
follow government policies regarding immigration and consistently push for more 
liberal laws.  
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Due to the high percentage of recent immigrants, Mexican Americans are also 
concerned with social security legislation. As many work blue-collar jobs, 
government funded social security benefits are vital to many. President Bush’s 
recent announcement to cut social security benefits to offset military spending 
caused strong c riticism by Mexican American political leaders. In his speech 
concerning the budget for fiscal year 2007, President Bush proclaimed an increase 
of defense spending by nearly 7 percent and at the same time the cutting of 
“entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.”
149 
Reductions in benefits provided by the government will hurt a large segment of 
the Mexican American population and will in all likelihood lead to protests. 
 
One of the goals of finding work in the United States is to send money home in 
order to support relatives. Remittances sent from Mexican Americans to their 
families total more than 10 billion a year,
150 constituting a significant part of 
Mexico’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Remittances are flowing to all sectors 
of M exican society and to virtually every region making 18 percent of the adult 
population receivers of such monetary help.
151 As a consequence, Mexican 
Americans closely follow government policy to promote competition in financial 
services, especially remittances, to increase the amount of money that reaches the 
recipient families and to improve payment systems that guarantee fast and secure 
transactions.  
 
Although their long history on U.S. soil and recent immigration figures make 
Mexican Americans not only the largest national-origin group of the Latino 
population but the most diverse as well there are analogies. The four mentioned 
issues citizenship status, immigration, social security benefits, and remittances are 
important to the vast majority. As analyzed  above, the legacy of Mexican 
American politics reaches back to the beginning of the 19
th century, providing this 
group with a unique background not only among Latinos, but among other 
minorities as well.  Specific history of Mexican American politics and 
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experiences during World War II led to the Chicano Movement, the Latino 
version of the Civil Rights Movement making Mexican Americans the 
forerunners of  Latino politics as it is exercised today.  
 
 
 
 
7. Cuban Americans 
 
Cuban Americans form the third largest Latino national-origin group after 
Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. Although only 1.3 million people trace their roots to 
Cuba, this ethnicity carries extensive political influence, due to its heavy 
concentration in Florida and New Jersey. The state of Florida is home to more 
than 800,000 Cuban Americans, whereas 650,000 live in the area of Miami, 
turning the city into the second biggest “Cuban” city after Havana.
152 The fact that 
Cubans are thus heavily concentrated, accounts for their visibility and political 
clout. The state of Florida, with its 25 Electoral College votes, has long been a so-
called  swing state
153 providing Cuban Americans with an exceptional strong 
political sway on state and national politics.  
No politician can afford to set aside the votes and financial contributions in a state 
like Florida, whose electorate is almost evenly divided between the two major 
parties. By virtue of this exposed situation, Cuban American lobby groups and 
politicians are able to enforce their demands, even if a majority of the U.S. 
population rejects them. This is the case with the embargo towards Cuba, where 
70 percent of U.S. citizens support abolition.
154 Political success of Cuban 
Americans is predominantly based on goal-oriented actions. The Cuban American 
National Foundation (CANF) and its long-time leader Jorge Mas Canosa are to be 
mentioned in this context due to their exceptional influence. 
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Cuban Americans vary sharply from Mexican Americans and other Latino 
national-origin groups, primarily by virtue of their self-definition as an exile- 
rather than an immigrant community. Based on this perception, Cuban Americans 
developed a distinctive political culture fundamentally different from that of other 
Latinos. “This political culture is stereotypically defined by  its right-wing, anti-
Castro politics and automatic antipathy toward all things ‘leftist’.”
155 Unlike the 
vast majority of other Latino national-origin groups, they support the Republican 
Party in large numbers. More than half of registered voters (52%) who trace their 
origins to Cuba considered themselves to be Republicans, whereas Mexicans 
(18%) and Puerto Ricans (17%) vote Republican at a much smaller rate.
156 
Voter registration and voting rates are much higher among Cuban Americans in 
comparison to other Latinos, possibly due to help by U.S. politics. Unlike 
Mexican, or any other immigrants, Cubans were not only welcomed but even 
encouraged to come to the United States. Between 1959 and 1980 “a de facto 
immigration policy of  open arms was driven by the Cold W ar, active U.S. 
opposition to Fidel Castro’s rule, and humanitarian concerns.”
157 Thus, 
consecutive U.S. administrations regarded Cuban immigrants as “propaganda 
tools” during most of the period of the Cold War, supporting emigration from 
Cuba.  
Admittedly, most Cubans coming to the United States were eager to return to their 
country as soon as Fidel Castro was overthrown. Thus, political objectives of 
Cuban exiles and U.S. governments corresponded, laying the basis for exceptional 
political influence of the  Cuban American community. Considering the political 
agenda, Cuban Americans constituted a largely monolithic bloc for several 
decades. Within the last decade, however, they have increasingly turned into a 
multi-faceted population. The  Cuban Cause, ending C astro’s dictatorship, did not 
remain a top priority and was replaced by domestic (U.S.) issues, signaling a turn 
in Cuban American cognition. 
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Fundamental to the understanding of the development of Cuban American politics 
is the historical background of U.S.-Cuban relations and the aftermath of the 
Cuban revolution.   
  
 
 
7.1. Historical Background 
Cuban immigration to the United States did not, as is widely assumed, begin after 
Fidel Castro’s revolution in 1959, but instead, more than a century earlier. “The 
Cuban presence in Florida dates back to the 1830s when Cuban cigar 
manufacturers, trying to avoid high U.S. tariffs, relocated their operations in Key 
West.”
158 Cigar manufacturing was big business in Cuba and the United States 
was its most important market. In the 1850s and 1860s, Cuban immigration 
increased even further. “When the tariffs threatened to put small manufacturers 
out of business and after the failure of a revolt against Spain in 1868, some of the 
smart ones moved their production to U.S. soil to avoid the tariffs and took their 
Cuban workers with them.”
159 Besides cigar manufacturers, professionals 
migrated to the United States, albeit in small numbers. Most Cubans settled in the 
areas of Key West, Florida and New York City. 
The war against Spain in 1898 caused a second wave of migrants to the United 
States, however, a small one. Over the years, Cuban immigrants did not turn out 
in significant numbers within the United States. They were by far outnumbered by 
Mexican immigrants. Massive immigration of Cubans was to start in 1959, 
shortly after Fidel Castro and his  26
th of July Movement successfully overthrew 
Fulgencio Batista and declared a new political system on the island. 
 
After the Cuban Revolution in 1959, four waves of immigrants arrived in  the 
United States, each having a distinct historical motivation.
160 Between 1959 and 
1964 around 270,000 Cubans entered the United States. They were mostly 
supporters of the Batista regime, as well as members of Cuba’s upper class. “The 
latter, often implicated in Batista’s shady deals even if they had not been political 
supporters, were frightened or enraged by the new regime’s assaults on property 
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(urban reform, which cut rents in half, and agrarian reform, which expropriated 
land) and by its bad manners.”
161  
Yet, the first Cuban immigrants were not a homogenous group. Disillusioned 
members of Castro’s regime entered the United States, as did “almost all of the 
Cuban Jews; by 1983, no more than 750 Jews were left in Cuba out of nearly 
15,000 Jews who had lived on the island before the revolution.”
162 
 
Between 1965 and 1973 the so-called  freedom flights brought around 300,000 
Cubans to the United States. The freedom flights were the result of a massive visa 
enactment for Cubans by the United States government. It paid for and organized 
the emigration from Cuba of more than 250,000 people. During these years, 
primarily technical workers arrived with a lower economic standing, thus sharply 
differing from the first immigrants. “Only 22 percent of the second wave have 
household incomes of $50,000 or above, compared to 44 percent of 1959-64 
cohort households.”
163 Among them were many liberals and socialists who had 
fought against the Batista regime in the underground but rejected Castro’s policy. 
Miami became the center o f Cuban immigration, undergoing a substantial change. 
Cuban immigrants created their own society, including Cuban newspapers, radio, 
and even television. Cuban businesses opened, selling products from the island 
and offering service in Spanish. The second  wave of Cuban immigrants 
“benefited, however, from the work of previous middle- and upper-class Cuban 
émigrés of the 1960s. About half of the Cuban immigrants worked in Cuban-
owned or managed firms and earned somewhat better wages than those who 
worked outside this enclave.”
164 
The  Mariel Boatlift in 1980 brought another 125,000 Cubans to the U.S. After 
some 10,000 Cubans occupied the Peruvian embassy in Havana, seeking for 
asylum in the United States, the Castro Government opened the port of the city of 
Mariel, to secure a well-regulated departure. The Carter Administration, following 
Cold War policy of its predecessors, declared that the United States would 
“provide an open heart and open arms for the tens of thousands of refugees 
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seeking freedom from Communist domination.”
165 Even though the time of 
rapprochement in Cold War policy had already begun, propaganda was still in the 
interest of either superpower.  
Yet, the boatlift differed significantly from the first two immigration waves.   
Widely uncontrolled i mmigration of such a huge number of immigrants within a 
very short period of time marked significant problems for the United States. 
Although the majority of Mariel immigrants have become 
integrated into U.S. society and the number of hardened 
criminals was grossly exaggerated, the Cuban government 
did allow and/or encourage the emigration of a significant 
number of people who had backgrounds as petty criminals 
and many who had adjustment problems in Cuba. The 
Cuban government had previously used immigration as a 
political and economic escape valve; in 1980, it used it as a 
weapon as well.
166 
 
Indeed, criminals accounted for “less than 3 percent of the Mariel Cubans.”
167 
Furthermore, immigrants who arrived in the United States in 1980 most probably 
emigrated for different reasons than those coming with earlier waves. Since they 
had lived most of their lives in post-revolution Cuba, it may be expected that 
migration was accelerated by economic considerations. 
 
The period between 1990 and 2000 marked the last significant wave of Cuban 
immigration, accounting for approximately 130,000 migrants. Collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1989 led to one of Cuba’s worst economic crises. “In the early 
1990s, Cuba experienced a decrease in gross domestic product (GDP) without 
parallel in the region, with GDP falling more than 40 percent between 1989 and 
1993.”
168 Demise of the Cuban economy provided the basis for recent migration 
from Cuba into the United States. 
However, this wave differs fundamentally in its strategic importance to  the United 
States in comparison to earlier Cuban immigration. After the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Cuba lost its unique position as a propaganda tool, thus moving the 
Clinton Government to end its preferential immigration policy towards Cuban 
immigrants. “The United States introduced the current  wet-foot/dry-foot policy 
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(immigrants found at sea are returned to the island while those who make it to 
land are granted asylum) and equalized the number of annual visas for Cuba to 
that of other countries of the world at 20,000.”
169 Many Cubans, however, 
attempting to reach American soil and intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard, were 
detained at the military base at Guantánamo. This policy change did not stop the 
flow of migrants, yet, it did create an increasingly problematic situation in 
Guantánamo, leading to hunger strikes and riots. Consequently, it was dissolved 
as a reception camp for Cuban refugees in 1994. 
Considering the four immigration waves, it becomes apparent that most Cuban 
immigrants arrived in the United States for political reasons. Their personal 
motivation led to distinct political consciousness among Cuban Americans, which 
influences their participation within the political system of the United States.  
 
 
 
7.2. Cuban Politics 
Political activity by Cuban Americans was long a  single-issue effort. Whereas 
other Latino national-origin groups engaged in local politics in order to secure 
higher living standards and execute their rights, Cuban Americans were perceived 
as exclusively concerned with overthrowing Castro and returning to their 
homeland. Anti-Castro hardliners designated Cuban American politics, seeking to 
influence U.S. policy towards Cuba. “Any tactic was justified in the war against 
Castro; the exile community was often as repressive and authoritarian as the 
government they sought to overthrow. There was little tolerance of those who 
favored an accommodation of the Castro government.”
170 
With every year Castro stayed in charge, return to Cuba became more and more 
improbable, thus leading to increasing efforts on the improvement of their lives in 
the United States. As early as the 1970s, with the end of the freedom flights, many 
Cubans became aware that their stay in the United States would be more than just 
a temporary visit. On the basis of this m ind change, Cuban Americans began to 
engage in their new home. This became evident in several areas. Economic 
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success of the Cuban community by far outnumbered that of other Latino 
national-origin groups.
171  
By 1980, émigrés in Dade County generated close to $2.5 
billion in income each year. Forty-four percent of the 
nearly five hundred thousand Cubans living in greater 
Miami were professionals, company managers, business 
owners, skilled craftsmen, or retail sales and clerical 
personnel, and eighteen thousand businesses were Cuban-
owned. Sixty-three percent of émigrés owned their own 
homes.
172 
 
Albeit economic success of some of the upper and middle class, Cuban net worth 
in general still remains below of that of Anglo Americans.
173 Nevertheless there 
are disparities in net worth among Cuban Americans, which caused heavy 
criticism of some stating that their successful fellow countrymen would sacrifice 
the Cuban cause for their new comforts. Some perceived economic improvement 
of the community as a denial of their  responsibilities toward Cuba, however, 
increased engagement in American society also led to the ambition to gain U.S. 
citizenship.  
Naturalization rates increased rapidly, providing for more extended involvement 
in local, and domestic politics. Whereas many Cubans previously declined the 
possibility of applying for U.S. citizenship, the 1970s marked a turning point. 
“The  Miami Herald reported in 1974 that approximately two hundred thousand 
Cubans had sought U.S. citizenship. […] By 1980, 55 percent of the e ligible 
Cubans in Dade County were American citizens, compared to just 25 percent in 
1970.”
174 
U.S. citizenship now offered new opportunities to engage in local and statewide 
politics. In 1965, Cuban businessmen created the  Latin American Chamber of 
Commerce, to lobby on behalf of Dade County’s business community. “In 1970, 
émigrés created the Cuban National Planning Council to study domestic (U.S.) 
issues that were important to Cubans, including language, education, health care, 
and employment.”
175 Several attempts of Cuban Americans to win public offices 
failed until 1973, when Manolo Reboso was elected to the City Commission and 
Alfredo Duran to the School Board of Dade County.  
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To this day, neither Cuban American politicians nor lobby groups entirely 
abandoned endeavors to overthrow Castro, but within the last thirty years, 
political orientation grew more diverse. This was partly due to political reality and 
events, such as the end of the Cold War, partly because of changing demography 
of the Cuban American population. U.S.-born Cubans tended to follow a broader 
approach in order to end Castro’s dictatorship than did the older generation, 
which fled the island after 1959. Whereas hardliners of the older generation 
favored the economic embargo as the most important tool, younger Cubans and 
liberals suggest that the embargo contributes to the country’s widespread poverty, 
thus, hurting the people they intend to help. 
 
 
 
7.2.1. Generational Differences in Cuban American Politics 
Cuban American politics are to be e xamined with close attention paid to time of 
arrival in the United States. Cuban immigrants arriving within the first fifteen 
years after the revolution of 1959 were, and still are, almost exclusively 
concerned with overthrowing Castro. Measures to achieve their goal were 
assigned by hardliners, who lobbied for an economic and political embargo 
against the Castro regime. Their incitements come from losses  – economical and 
personal  – many had to suffer after Castro came to power. “The economic, social, 
and p olitical elites in Miami are almost exclusively composed of Cubans from this 
generation.”
176  
For many years the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and its leader 
Jorge Mas Canosa were most important in the guiding of politics of Cuban 
Americans. His  manner of advocating his policy was controversial among Cuban 
Americans and regularly subject to fierce criticism. Critics perceived Canosa and 
the other founding members of  CANF “politically sophisticated extremists with a 
tight grip on the Cuban American electorate. They direct Cuban Americans to 
vote overwhelmingly for hand-picked candidates, who purvey hard-line anti-
Castro policies in Tallahassee and Washington.”
177  
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Three issues dominated their political agenda, namely an uncompromising 
attitude of opposition towards Cuba, strong support for the Republican Party, and 
intransigent rejection of unrestricted travel to the island. Thus, the  old guard 
favored a strict policy, which left no room for reconciliation. For decades they 
controlled the political orientation of the whole Cuban American community, 
providing U.S. and international public with a picture of a monolithic political 
force. “They built the political machine that ensures that all Cuban American 
office holders loudly voice anti-engagement positions regarding US-Cuba 
relations.”
178 
Given recent immigration from Cuba and increasing numbers of U.S.-born Cuban 
Americans, the community did not only change its demographic characteristics 
but also its political agenda. Cuban immigrants who arrived in the United States 
with the Mariel Boatlift in 1980 or later vary in their political views from the old 
guard. Freeing Cuba of Castro’s dictatorship still remains one of the priorities, 
yet, other issues become more important. “In a June 2003 survey of Cuban 
Americans, 62 % of the respondents felt that it was more important to spend time 
and money improving life in South Florida rather than focusing on changing the 
government in Cuba.”
179 
The decisive distinction between the two generations lies in the fact that  the 
younger consider Miami, or the United States in general, to be their home. They 
were born and raised there, internalizing U.S. culture, such as language and 
manners. Additionally, second generation Cuban Americans dispose of higher 
education and income levels than do first generation Cubans,
180 which generally 
involves more contact with non-Cuban Americans. Thus, exchange of varying 
ideas and opinions commonly leads to a more open-minded attitude towards 
moderate policies.  
Recent immigrants agree with second generation Cuban Americans on liberal 
measures towards Cuba, since most of them still have family and friends on the 
island that they want to visit and support financially. Therefore, they oppose 
restricted travel, high taxes on remittances, and limitation of expenditures while in 
Cuba, instead favoring dialogue between the two countries. They consider the 
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embargo policy as failed, since it did not lead to Castro’s downfall, despite being 
in place for more than forty years. 
Even though “they comprise m ore than 50 % of the total Cuban-American 
community, […] their voice is heard far less than the old guard. They lack the 
resources to be as politically powerful as other segments of the community, and 
their voter registration percentages are far lower.”
181 N evertheless, impact of this 
part of Cuban Americans will grow with time and change the fundamentals of the 
Cuban American policy agenda.  
 
 
 
7.2.2. The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) 
Founding of the Cuban American National Foundation in 1981 marked a turning 
point for Cuban American political efforts. Right-wing activities to overthrow 
Castro were limited to occasional, poorly planned and executed, commando 
operations. A structured organization, which directed the efforts, was not existent. 
The election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980 was to emerge as a stroke of 
luck for Cuban American hardliners. 
From the beginning the Reagan administration emphasized Cuba’s role as a 
security threat to the United States. In the midst of the Cold War Reagan steadily 
underlined that a communist country being only 90 miles away from the U.S. 
mainland was not acceptable. “Both the Reagan administration and a Cuban 
American lobby had much to gain from the other’s success in shaping public 
views about Cuba.”
182 Thus, establishment of  CANF proceeded in close 
coordination with the Reagan administration. Several versions of exactly how 
CANF was founded are still subject of debate. Whether  CANF was founded 
independently by Cuban Americans, or due to the suggestion of R ichard Allen, 
Reagan’s first National Security Adviser, still remains unclear. 
Nevertheless,  CANF and the Reagan administration closely collaborated, given 
their compatible views on Cuba. Shortly after inauguration, President Reagan 
created the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, putting Jorge Mas 
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Canosa, founding member of  CANF, on the commission. He supported the idea of 
a radio program, sending “objective” information to the Cuban people. “In 
October 1983 President Reagan signed into law the bill that led to the first 
broadcast by Radio Martí in May 1985. The chair of the Advisory Committee for 
Cuban Broadcasting at the time was Jorge Mas Canosa.”
183 
Radio Martí became an important tool in  CANF’s effort to destabilize the Castro 
regime. It provided investigative news coverage on a variety of topics such as 
Communist Party Congresses in Havana, AIDS, the defection of high-ranking 
military and government officials to the U.S., and news stories from around the 
world. “Listeners also heard readings  of suppressed literature, interviews with 
former political prisoners, and philosophical discussions with various religious 
leaders […].”
184 
Despite its analytical news coverage, Radio Martí was still a tool in CANF’s effort 
to overthrow Castro. It was established to support an uprising within Cuba, since 
previous actions by the exile community did not lead to the desired effect. 
Even though the Castro regime tried to jam Radio Martí’s signals it was quite 
successful and listened to in most parts of the country. Close ties between Cuban 
exiles and the Reagan administration provided the basis for massive influence on 
the radio’s program by CANF.  
Until 1997, Mas [Canosa] held the chairmanship of the 
Advisory Committee continuously since his original 
appointment. Radio Martí’s annual budget during those 
years was in the $12-15 million range, and one critic sees 
that money as an example of U.S. taxpayer money funding 
what is ‘virtually a Cuban exile propaganda organ.’
185  
 
In 1990, TV Martí was founded, intended to e xtend the exiles influence on their 
home country. Jorge Mas Canosa chaired TV Martí as he did with the radio 
program, thus, practically monopolizing U.S. efforts to counter Castro’s 
propaganda, which is even more worth mentioning, when taking into account that 
funding was largely drawn from taxes. “Furthermore, a 1992 study by the 
Government Accounting Office […] criticized TV Martí for its lack of balance 
and for promoting the views of the CANF too much.”
186  
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CANF’s policy towards Cuba focused on other measures as well. With its Free 
Cuba Political Action Committee (PAC) extensive lobbying was accomplished. 
“[T]he Free Cuba PAC rewarded senators and congressmen who supported a 
tougher policy toward Cuba with substantial donations to their reelection 
campaigns. From 1983 to 1988, the Free Cuba PAC contributed over $385,000 to 
congressmen of both political parties […].”
187 Efforts resulted in several 
legislations aimed on isolating Cuba, such as the Cuban Democracy Act, which 
imposed fines on U.S. corporations whose foreign subsidiaries traded with Cuba. 
In 1989, Congress passed a bill that was strongly lobbied by CANF, “prohibiting 
ships traveling to or from Cuba from stopping in American ports.”
188 
Collaboration between the Reagan administration and  CANF became a n ovelty in 
U.S. history. For the first time ever, the refugee process was privatized by 
assigning  CANF with the responsibility of handling Cuban exiles entry from third 
countries. Even though Mas Canosa claimed that  CANF would not receive any 
funding from t he government, “in 1991 the organization became eligible to 
receive $588 of federal funds for each immigrant. And during the same year, the 
Department of Human Health and Services authorized $1.7 million for 2,000 
more Cubans under another Cuban Exodus Relief Fund program.”
189 Thus, CANF 
not only profited financially and through membership increase, it was also at its 
height of influence, actively directing U.S. immigration policy. 
Jorge Mas Canosa regularly held meetings with President Reagan adjusting 
further proceedings concerning Cuba. Both sides profited from each other. 
CANF’s foundation and success during the 1980’s is closely connected to the 
political situation at that time. Ronald Reagan provided for a shift to the right, 
after four years of Democratic policy under Jimmy Carter. Because Reagan’s 
political agenda coincided with that of the Cuban American community in 
general, and  CANF’s in particular, Mas Canosa and his organization were able to 
follow their aims backed by the government. For over a decade the  Cuban 
American National Foundation dominated political efforts by Cuban exiles, 
putting them in the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. 
It consistently faced heavy criticism for violating civil liberties. The  Inter-
American Press Association and Americas Watch, a human rights group, accused 
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CANF in 1992 of using “its political and financial clout to intimidate more liberal 
voices.”
190 Trigger for this criticism was  CANF’s massive propaganda against the 
Miami Herald, which was viewed as too benevolent t owards Castro. The 
foundation used its political and financial capabilities to start a unique propaganda 
campaign, including the threat to launch an advertising boycott.  
Despite the criticism and questionable actions,  CANF still remains the most 
popular a nd influential Cuban American organization, even after the Reagan 
years. This may be attributed to the perception of the vast majority of Cuban 
Americans who feel that  CANF has done much more than any other organization 
in the struggle against Castro. Additionally, local efforts to help or improve living 
standards serve as reasons for strong loyalty.  
The role of  CANF in U.S. foreign policy, especially during the Reagan years, 
needs to be analyzed against the background of how much influence ethnic groups 
may execute. The case of  CANF is unparalleled in U.S. history, demonstrating 
extensive Cuban American influence on U.S. politics, despite their relatively 
small numbers. 
 
 
 
7.3. Cuban Americans Today 
After the end of the Cold War, Cuban American lobbying receded, and traditional 
voting behavior and political attitudes began to change. Measures by the Bush 
administration in 2004, shortly before the election, limiting travel between the 
United States and Cuba and restriction of remittance sending, led to significant 
protest within the Cuban American community. Starting June 2004, Cuban 
Americans were only allowed to make one two-week visit every three years, 
instead of unrestricted annual visits. As well, they are not allowed to send  
unlimited remittances to f riends on the island and none beyond their immediate 
families. Additionally, all humanitarian visits are prohibited.  
These measures caused massive criticism among Cuban Americans and for the 
first time they founded an organization for the prevention of the reelection of 
George W. Bush.
191 In the course of his election campaign, John Kerry gladly 
used this issue to outline his policy. Kerry pointed out that he would not plan any 
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restrictions on remittances, and that he would leave it to Congress to decide on 
travel limitations. However, Kerry’s efforts came too late to draw significant 
numbers of Cuban American voters from the Republicans.  
Already in 2000, government intervention in the Elián González affair led to 
substantial protest, which revealed that besides their sentiments against Castro, 
Cuban Americans do not accept such drastic interference in personal affairs. They 
took to the streets to protest measures by the Clinton administration to send the 
child back to his father in Cuba. 
The seven year-old boy was found floating on an inner tube off the Florida coast. 
His mother had died attempting to flee Cuba, and he was brought to his great-
uncle, who lived in Miami. Cuban American political leaders, such as Miami 
Mayor Joe Carollo and Miami-Dade County Executive Mayor Alex Penelas, 
argued that Elián should be permitted to stay in Miami. They regarded unification 
with his father as synonymous with supporting Castro and his regime. Despite 
strong resistance and mass protests by some Cuban Americans, the U.S. 
government  returned the child to Cuba, where he was reunited with his father. 
The case of Elián González caused emotional debates among Cuban Americans 
about the embargo and its effects. In regard of the boy’s fate many started to 
rethink their standpoint of absolutely supporting the embargo, acknowledging that 
a different policy might avert such incidents. 
Debate among Cuban Americans about the Elián case and the embargo revealed 
to the public what long had been reality among Cuban Americans in the Miami 
area: a multifaceted national-origin group tolerating varying attitudes and 
opinions. “Where before the only acceptable question was whether one supported 
military action or just continuing the embargo, ‘now people are beginning to 
openly question the efficacy and morality of the embargo’ […].”
192 This change 
in political positions may be attributed to political and demographic realities, as 
elucidated before.  
 
It is foreseeable that a new generation, with different social backgrounds, will 
take the places  of current leaders who are almost exclusively hardliners in terms 
of political orientation. Cuban American members of Congress such as Ileana 
Ros-Lethinen and Lincoln Díaz-Balart support and actively lobby for retention 
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and even intensification of the embargo. Both supported the travel and remittance 
restrictions enacted by the Bush Administration. By taking this position both 
leaders moved away from their base, loosing the bond, which is necessary for 
politicians.  
Besides alteration among Cuban Americans, the Latino population in Florida as a 
whole has undergone significant demographic changes. Cuban Americans 
constitute only a third of the 2.6 million Latinos in the State of Florida, however, 
they hold “all three of the congressional seats, all three of the State Senate seats, 
and nearly all of the eleven State House seats in majority Hispanic districts 
[…].”
193 Nevertheless, the two-thirds of non-Cuban Latinos in the state are 
growing faster than do Cuban Americans, thus catering for new citizens, who are 
allowed to vote. In the near future, they will constitute a more significant voting 
bloc due to their numbers than Cuban Americans, changing politicians’ focus on 
whom to court.  
Three main factors contribute to the decrease of Cuban American influence on 
U.S. politics, both on a state- and nationwide level. First, generational differences 
reveal the growing diversity among Cuban Americans and varying political 
views. Increasing heterogeneity is owed to different socializations among first-, 
second-, and third-generation Cubans and political reality, as in the case of the 
failed embargo policy. Secondly, Cuban Americans detached from their former 
almost unanimous support for the Republican Party, threatening to cast their vote 
for Democratic candidates. And f inally, the fast growing non-Cuban Latino 
population furthers the decline of the third largest Latino national-origin group.   
 
Despite internal political fragmentation among the once homogenous Cuban 
American population and receding influence one fact needs to be noticed: the 
unparalleled political influence on U.S. domestic and foreign policy. No other 
minority, neither among Latino national-origin groups nor any other disposed or 
disposes of comparable power.
194 Cuban American political engagement and 
impact is unique among Latinos clearly distinguishes them from Mexican 
Americans and even from Puerto Ricans, who themselves dispose of a unique 
feature.   
                                                 
193 Geron, 144. 
194 Jewish Americans are not considered in this context, since they do not represent a minority by 
definition of the Cenus Bureau.                                                                                                                  
  74
8. Puerto Ricans 
 
In terms of political status, relations between Puerto Rico and the United States 
are  exceptional. Since 1952, Puerto Rico has been a self-governing island 
commonwealth associated with the United States. In its constitution, the island is 
officially termed a “freely associated state”; critics and objective observers call it 
the world’s last colony. Self-determination is limited; the constitution may only 
be altered by the commonwealth government assuming it does not conflict with 
the U.S. constitution or the Puerto Rico-Federal Relations Act that regulates U.S.- 
Puerto Rican relations. 
 
Around four million Puerto Ricans live in the United States, constituting the 
second largest national-origin group among Latinos. In contrast to all other 
Latinos, they dispose of a unique attribute: since 1917, they hold U.S. citizenship 
by birth, allowing them to enter the country and work there without any legal 
restrictions. Despite this exclusive advantage, Puerto Ricans are still mostly 
perceived as foreigners, due to their dark skin and the Spanish language.  
The contradiction of being at once citizens a nd foreigners, 
when joined with the reality that [it is] a racially mixed 
population, has made Puerto Rican migrant experience in 
America profoundly schizophrenic, more similar in some 
ways to that of African Americans or Native Americans 
than to any other Latino group.
195 
 
However, considering the history of Puerto Rican-United States relations, 
commonalities emerge with Cuban experiences. Both countries were occupied by 
the U.S. Army in the course of the Spanish-American War in 1898. Whereas 
Cuba officially gained independence in 1902, the smaller and economically less 
attractive island of Puerto Rico remains a colonial possession to this day. This 
political reality with its economic and cultural implications has affected and 
continues to affect Puerto Rican political engagement in the United States. A 
lower level of political participation, in comparison to other Latino groups, is 
ironically attributed to their U.S. citizenship.  
For Puerto Ricans […] citizenship has been portrayed as an 
obstacle to participation in the United States, orienting 
them towards the island and rooting them there 
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psychologically. As a result, Puerto Ricans have been 
described as apathetic about politics in the United States; 
their interest is captured by island politics, underscored by 
the ‘ideology of return’, disengaging them from political 
involvement in the United States.
196   
 
By holding U.S. citizenship, back-and-forth travel between island and mainland 
does not pose any obstacles but lessens emotional and factual attachment to  the 
United States. In contrast to Mexican and Cuban realities, Puerto Ricans are not 
necessarily bound or eager to stay in the United States to achieve their objectives, 
be they economic, political, or cultural. Most Puerto Ricans hold close ties to the 
island, pursuing a way of life that is equally centred both on the island and on the 
mainland. These specific factors shape Puerto Rican political engagement in the 
United States, and may be attributed to the exceptional relation between the two 
countries. 
In consideration of the common history, many Puerto Ricans feel ambivalent 
toward the United States. “They are resentful that they were never given the 
chance to rule their own destiny and are indignant over their treatment in this 
country. This attitude is quite different from that of the great majority of those 
individuals who flocked to the United States during the great migration,”
197 and 
must be ascribed to the common history of both countries.   
 
 
 
8.1. Historical Background   
Intended as a struggle for  independence, the Spanish-American war of 1898 only 
resulted in the change of the colonial power in Puerto Rico. U.S. leaders at that 
time regarded their intentions to be the best for the island’s inhabitants, as the 
U.S. major general, who directed the invasion, explained: “This is not a war of 
devastation, but one to give to all within the control of its military and naval 
forces the advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization.”
198 In the first 
                                                 
196 Vargas-Ramos, Carlos: The Political Participation of Puerto Ricans in New York City, Centro 
Journal, Volume XV No. 1, Spring 2003, 40-71; 47. 
197 Torres, Andrés:  Political Radicalism in the Diaspora – The Puerto Rican Experience, in: 
Torres, Andrés/ Velázquez, José E.:  The Puerto Rican Movement – Voices from the Diaspora, 
Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1998; 12. 
198 Morris, Nancy:  Puerto Rico: Culture, Politics, and Identity, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 
1995; 23.                                                                                                                  
  76
place the concept of “enlightened civilization” envisioned securing U.S. power 
and influence on the island. It was this self-conception of doing right by U.S. 
officials that led to the decision to extend the stay on the island and secure close 
relations in the future. 
After eighteen months of military occupation the  Foraker Act
199 provided for a 
civil government under U.S. control. Limited self-government was granted to 
Puerto Ricans without decreasing American influence. In 1917, U.S. Congress 
passed the  Jones Act
200 making Puerto Ricans citizens of the United States. 
Literally over night a Spanish-speaking population became part of the United 
States, including almost all rights but also the duties of a U.S. citizen. Thus, 
towards the end of World War I the U.S. Army suddenly disposed of a bigger 
array for recruitment. The acquired territory also brought new people to the 
United States. Before the war of 1898 only few Puerto Ricans lived on the U.S. 
mainland. Puerto Rican immigration started in significant numbers in the 
beginning of the 20
th century and may be classified into three major periods.
201  
Between 1900 and 1945, roughly after annexation and until the end of World War 
II, first Puerto Rican immigrants arrived and settled almost exclusively in New 
York City. “Mutual aid societies, social clubs, and community-based and political 
organizations were created to enhance the socioeconomic status of Puerto Ricans 
and defend the community against discriminatory acts.”
202 Hence, a base was 
formed, facilitating further immigration from the island. 
The second period, from 1946 to 1964, is called “the great migration” since more 
than 40,000 migrated from the Caribbean to New York City in 1946 alone.
203 Not 
only did the communities in New York City increase significantly, but Puerto 
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Ricans, who moved to Chicago and New Jersey, also discovered new areas of 
settlement. “By 1960, more than 1 million were in the country,”
204 making Puerto 
Ricans the fastest growing Latino national-origin group of that time. 
The period from 1965 to the present is termed “the revolving-door migration”
205 
indicating high rates of back-and-forth travel between the island and the U.S. 
mainland. It also stands for a greater dispersion of Puerto Rican immigrants, who 
still mainly settle in the Northeast, preferably in New York City, but also in other 
parts of  the country, such as Illinois and Florida. These migrants tend to have 
relatives on the island as well as in the United States, socially and emotionally 
attaching them to both places.   
In contrast to Cuban, but similarly to Mexican immigration, Puerto Ricans mainly 
came to the United States with the hope of economic improvement. After World 
War II “an economic boom in the U.S. generated plentiful jobs for unskilled and 
semiskilled labor. This attracted many Puerto Ricans from their homeland, where 
chronic  unemployment and underemployment remained at high levels, and where 
wages lagged far behind those in the U.S.”
206 
Before annexation, Puerto Rico’s economy was composed of coffee and tobacco 
cultivation and export, but this changed with the new colonial power. U.S. 
companies were able to produce much cheaper on the island than they could on 
the mainland, and were supported to do so by the government. In 1948 Operation 
Bootstrap
207 was launched, a concept to industrialize the agrarian Puerto Rico. It 
involved tax incentives and subsidies for companies and was dependent on 
industrial peace and low wages in labor-intensive industries, especially those of 
textile and clothing. The tourism industry was also developed at that time turning 
Puerto Rico into one of Americans’ most favorite holiday destinations. 
 
The constitution of 1952 officially termed Puerto Rico a “free associated state”, 
providing it with far-reaching internal autonomy, but not challenging sustained 
sovereignty of the United States over the island. Puerto Ricans were allowed to 
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keep U.S. citizenship and continued to be freed from federal taxes. They also 
could “elect their local officials but have no vote in federal elections and continue 
to be represented in Congress by their resident commissioner, a  nonvoting 
member of the House of Representatives.”
208 
 
Besides political progress the United States increasingly invested in the island to 
meet the needs of a modern economy. “Between 1960 and 1976, tiny Puerto Rico 
catapulted from sixth to first in Latin America for total direct U.S. investment.”
209 
Although the island’s economy rapidly swell, the unemployment rate did not 
significantly decrease. “A distressing share of the income Puerto Ricans produce 
never touches Puerto Rican hands. In 1995, nearly four out of every ten dollars 
made on the island ended up in the bank account of a U.S. firm.”
210 Thus, Puerto 
Rico’s status as a colony and afterwards as a “free associated state” chiefly served 
United States interests with little commitment to the people and the d evelopment 
of the island. Puerto Rican political engagement in the United States has to be 
considered in view of these realities. 
 
 
 
8.2. Puerto Rican Politics 
Puerto Rican political activity in the U.S. started with the first wave of 
immigration in the beginning of the 20
th century, after the United States had 
annexed the island. Political organizations and clubs were formed in the area of 
New York City, where the vast majority lived, working on a community level in 
order to help their fellow citizens with everyday problems. “The clubs made 
provision for health referrals, legal aid, and advice on housing and employment as 
well as counselling on other working-class problems.”
211   
 
Obtaining citizenship in 1917 opened up the possibility to register and vote, 
although most Puerto Ricans did not exercise this new right for two reasons. First, 
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despite citizenship Puerto Ricans were not supported to register and vote, in fact 
measures were taken to keep them away from the polls.  
The officials submitted the aspirant to an interrogation with 
the purpose of frightening them and making them abandon 
their original political persuasions. This only served to keep 
Puerto Ricans away from the polls. But they [Puerto 
Ricans] also believed that they had nothing to look for in 
American politics.
212 
 
The latter indicates the second and more significant reason for restricted political 
engagement. Puerto Ricans in general perceived, and still do, their stay in the 
United States as temporary, intended to earn enough money to return to the island. 
“The priority for working-class Puerto Ricans was not the achievement of 
political power but rather jobs and economic rewards.”
213  
In addition, the Office of the Commonwealth, created by the Puerto Rican 
government, served as an important factor for low political activity. It was 
intended to represent Puerto Rican interests in the United States. “During the 
1950s and 1960s, however, the existence of the Commonwealth office hindered 
the development of Puerto Rican politics in the United States [ …].”
214 Most 
Puerto Ricans presumed personal political actions to be not only unnecessary but 
also useless, given the government’s office. 
These factors combined account for a weak and disorganized political scene 
among Puerto  Ricans in the United States. In contrast to Cuban American 
political engagement, Puerto Ricans are not as willing to fight for the 
independence of their country. Too many advantages apply to the commonwealth 
status, including U.S. citizenship. Puerto Ricans vote in far smaller numbers t han 
do their fellow Latino citizens, even though they constitute the second biggest 
national-origin group among registered Latinos.
215  
Although there are Puerto Rican interest groups, such as the Puerto Rican Legal 
Defense and Education Fund ( PRLDEF), they  favor quiet lobbying, instead of 
publicity effective actions.  Additionally, the problematic nature to combine 
political interests on the island with those on the mainland affects Puerto Rican 
engagement. “[…T]here is no evidence that mass political mobilization around 
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homeland issues ever translated into mass political mobilization focused on 
mainland empowerment.”
216 This thesis is supported by Roberto Ramirez, Puerto 
Rican civil rights activist and politician in New York City, who denies a 
connection between Puerto Rican politics on the mainland and the island: 
“Political leadership in both places has failed miserably to connect the two 
interests. What we do here and what we do there are totally different, totally 
separate. In fact, leadership in Puerto Rico has failed to realize the importance of 
the leadership here.”
217  
Nevertheless, in the 1960s several leftist Puerto Rican groups outside of the 
political system began to combine island and mainland politics.   
 
 
 
8.2.1. The Puerto Rican Movement 
Three groups were especially important in what came to be known “The Puerto 
Rican Movement”: the  Young Lords Party, El Comité-Movimiento de Izquierda 
Nacional Puertorriqueno, MINP (National Puerto Rican Leftist Movement), and 
the  Movimiento Pro Independencia, MPI (Movement for Independence). These 
were the core organizations emerging at the end of the great migration when over 
a million Puerto Ricans lived in the United States, making it a significant political 
entity. The Puerto Rican Movement as a whole, and the groups in particular, did 
only partly act within the political system, campaigning as parties for elected 
offices, but organized outside the parliamentary system.  
In the late 1950s, the Young Lords formed out of a youth group in Chicago, where 
a substantial  part of Puerto Ricans lived. In 1969, the organization extended its 
reach to New York City, acknowledging the center of Puerto Rican political 
action. The  Young Lords were mainly composed by second generation Puerto 
Ricans, who stood for a more radical interpretation of Puerto Rican rights on the 
mainland. “The group’s actions pioneered a breakthrough with the public, 
effectively bringing attention to the crisis in the Puerto Rican community.”
218  
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Volume XV No. 1, Spring 2003, 152-175; 161. 
217 Matos Rodríguez, Félix V. :  Puerto Rican Politics in New York City: A Conversation with 
Roberto Ramirez, Centro Journal, Volume XV No.1, Spring 2003, 196-211; 207. 
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Economic, as well as racial and social issues were on their agenda, but also the 
independence of Puerto Rico. The  Young Lords regarded Puerto Ricans as an 
“oppressed national minority” calling for radical measures to end this status. 
Using democratic attainments such as free speech in promoting their cause, “[…] 
the  Lords were extremely effective in ‘working’ the mass media. They created an 
alternative media, including a radio program and a bilingual newspaper, 
Pa’lante,”
219 thus reaching the vast majority of Puerto Ricans in the United States 
and many on the island. 
 
MINP was founded in 1970 in New York City as a community action group, in 
order to oppose relocation of Puerto Ricans from their homes. Even though Puerto 
Ricans stood for the majority of members,  MINP also included other Latinos. It 
“initially supported bilingual education and community control. Later it evolved 
into a consciously leftist organization and sought to build support for socialism in 
the United States.”
220 Similarly to the Young Lords, MINP did not follow a single-
issue strategy but offered a wide-ranging program for the community. 
Besides its community organizing, the group organized a 
student sector and a workers’ organization and initiated a 
process that eventually led to the formation of the Latin 
Women’s Collective. Through its publication  Unidad 
Latina, it addressed the gamut of issues affecting the 
community, linking local issues to international forces.
221 
 
Although founded in 1960, it lasted until 1969 when the  Movement for 
Independence (MPI) was publicly recognized in the United States. The  older 
members were startled by the relative success of the  Young Lords, addressing 
local issues of concern. Intended to serve as a platform to press ahead the struggle 
for independence, in the late 1960s  MPI officials acknowledged the necessity of 
restructuring its strategy. “Winning independence was inconceivable without 
organizing the one-third of the nation that lived in the ‘belly of the beast’. And 
organizing this sector could not be done if the party was divorced from the 
community’s struggles for economic and social justice.”
222 
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A considerable advantage of  MPI was its status of an island’s political party 
extension, which secured strong support especially among young Puerto Ricans, 
who were waiting for such a connection.  The Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP) 
was well established on the island and supported its U.S. scion in every possible 
way. 
Cooperation among the various organizations, however, was rather complicated, 
given different priorities and ideological confrontations. They only partially 
united to address issues of common concern. One such case was the campaign to 
free five Nationalist prisoners, who opened fire in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, wounding five congressmen. They intended to draw public 
attention to Puerto Rico’s dependence to the United States that they considered to 
be colonialism. All were imprisoned and convicted to serve life-long sentences. In 
1970, the organizations came together at a conference, agreeing to commonly 
work on freeing the prisoners. When President Carter pardoned the five in 1979, 
“their release occasioned an emotional outpouring of joy and national pride  – 
something of a cathartic release, as  Boricuas
223 everywhere saw these national 
heroes returned to their homeland.”
224  
By the late 1970s, however, this positive experience did not push aside internal 
problems, which led to the breakup of all organizations and the movement as a 
whole. Although the Puerto Rican Movement failed its central objective of 
independence for the island, it nevertheless marked an important episode in 
Puerto Rican political engagement in the United States. It broke new grounds of 
collective identity and closely collaborated with the labor movement and the new 
left movement that arose during this period. Collectively with other leftist f orces, 
the Puerto Rican Movement represented an important alternative to mainstream 
politics during the 1960s.
225 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
223 The term  Boricua is the original term for Puerto Ricans, derived from the Taino Indians’ 
(native inhabitants of Puerto Rico) name for the island, Borinquén. It is often used by Puerto 
Ricans to emphasize pride in their heritage. 
224 Torres, 10. 
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8.3. Puerto Ricans Today  
Disintegration of the Puerto Rican Movement was followed by new strategies to 
give voice to Puerto Ricans in the political system. In 1977, the National Puerto 
Rican Coalition (NPRC) was founded due to acutely concerning economic 
circumstances most Puerto Ricans lived in. Widespread poverty among them even 
caused Jimmy Carter’s administration to call for Puerto Rican  activity within the 
U.S. political system. The  NPRC started to  systematically strengthen and improve 
the social, political, and foremost economic well being of Puerto Ricans 
throughout the United States. In the course of this “reawakening” of Puerto Rican 
politics several other civil rights and interest groups were formed, such as the 
National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, a successor of the Young Lords Party. 
The most important civil rights advocacy group, however, remains to be 
PRLDEF, because it is a ctively engaged in the maintenance and improvement of 
voting rights and political education. 
Political engagement has slowly started to grow, as numbers of Puerto Ricans on 
the U.S. mainland increase. Florida, a crucial “swing-state” in the last several 
presidential elections, is home to a fast growing Puerto Rican population. They 
soon will challenge Cuban dominance of Latino politics there by virtue of their 
numbers. In consideration of this fact both major parties started to develop 
campaign strategies d esigned to mobilize Puerto Ricans. Traditional tendencies of 
mainland Puerto Ricans to vote Democratic are beginning to fade, since new 
arrivals are more tied to island party loyalties and to issues of Puerto Rico’s 
political status than to specific U.S. m atters. Therefore, they value both parties 
rather in consideration of their standpoint toward Puerto Rico than domestic 
topics. 
The hybrid identity contributes to a split of the center of life what María E. Pérez 
y González calls a “dual home base”. This p henomenon of a two-home life may 
be attributed to the circumstance of holding U.S. citizenship and comparable low 
socio-economic life standard on the mainland. 
[I]t is […] an ‘internal response of the community to 
adverse conditions’. For example, when life in Puerto Rico 
becomes unmanageable due to lack of funds, the social 
service institutions in the States provide economic 
resources. Or when one’s health in the States is 
deteriorating, the place to seek healthier surroundings is 
Puerto Rico. Because the  economic structures set in place 
by the United States directly affect Puerto Rico, when there                                                                                                                  
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seems to be an economic surge in the United States, Puerto 
Ricans tend to (im)migrate to the States, and when the 
economic situation in Puerto Rico appears to be improving, 
they tend to return.”
226 
 
Most likely, this way of life will continue until significant changes are made in 
the political status of Puerto Rico, such as the unrestricted independence. As long 
as common status will be retained, social and political conduct is improbable to 
change. Political consciousness and engagement may be altered when both major 
parties increase efforts to attract Puerto Rican voters, mediating the necessity of 
active participation. Along with these steps, the advancement of economic 
circumstances is imperative.      
Despite the unique attribute of holding U.S. citizenship by birth Puerto Rican 
political engagement is comparably low, which is mainly because of two reasons. 
As mentioned before Puerto Ricans are torn between the U.S. mainland and 
Puerto Rico. Back and forth travel is common and prevents the United States to 
become the life center for Puerto Ricans. Secondly, Puerto Ricans do not possess  
significant influence in specific states due to extensive dispersion throughout the 
country. Thus, unlike Cuban Americans in Florida, Puerto Ricans may not be the 
decisive factor in a swing state. Despite these reasons explanation for low Puerto 
Rican political engagement remains to be fragmentary. Neither of the 
aforementioned factors elucidate why Puerto Ricans are only limitedly proactive. 
Academic research in this field is almost not existent but is likely to change in the 
future with growing influence of the Latino population in general and its second-
biggest national-origin group in particular.  
 
 
 
 
9. Final Remark 
 
Latino politics is a complex term intended to stand for an exceedingly 
heterogeneous part of the U.S. population and its participation in the political 
system. Inherently, the concept of politics is multi-faceted and  subject of far-
reaching academic research. Combination of both,  Latino and  politics comprise 
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diverse actions and actors making a broad generalization factual impossible. Yet, 
the term  Latino politics is used in academic literature as well as by the media and 
political actors to indicate forms of participation in the U.S. political system by a 
language-defined minority. 
In analyzing the three largest national-origin groups with their specific histories 
and political actions the aim was to provide a more tangible picture of Latinos. 
This complex and fast-growing minority has been subject of comprehensive 
academic research for around twenty years and is sure to increase in the future 
due to its size and growing influence. Latinos do not only grow in size, but i n 
diversity as well, given rising numbers of immigrants from the Dominican 
Republic and El Salvador as well as other countries – most notably from Central 
America. Even though the growth of Latinos will expand their influence on 
politics in the United States, at the same time their heterogeneity causes further 
differences among them. 
The multiplicity of political experiences among the three presented national-
origin groups makes wide generalizations difficult. Rapid advancement of  
influence on U.S. foreign policy by Cuban Americans in Florida is a rather 
singular pattern among Latino political efforts. Specific circumstances in 
international relations accounted for this extensive impact and helped Cubans to 
overcome discriminatory obstacles. Thus, the case  of Cuban Americans in Florida 
is not comparable to the Mexican American and Puerto Rican experience both 
suffering much longer “of entrenched structural discrimination and social 
ostracism.”
227  Aside from experiences by national-origin groups who look back 
on  a long history in the United States, recent immigrants from Central and South 
America stand at the beginning of finding their place in U.S. society. 
As Latinos do not share an identical political experience in this country 
examination of the three largest national-origin groups aimed to identify these 
varying experiences that have contributed to their histories before and after 
coming to the United States. Nevertheless, there are commonalities, especially in 
their colonial histories and reasons for immigrating to the United States. Mutual 
experiences proceeded within the United States, facing racism and obstruction in 
gaining elected offices. In terms of social and political conditions, status of almost 
all Latino immigrants (with the exception of most C uban Immigrants coming to 
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the U.S. between 1959 and 1964) was rather low. Economic aspects mainly drove 
immigration and are still the most important factors. However, as soon as starting 
their new lives in the wealthier north, paths lead to different directions.  
Many Latinos are prosperous, socially integrated and politically vocal. They hold 
prestigious occupations, such as lawyer, doctor or teacher and are U.S. citizens. 
Especially second and third generation Latinos are mostly English dominant, hold 
U.S. citizenship and are as “American” as every Anglo. They do not identify more 
with Spanish-speaking Latinos than they do with their African American or Anglo 
neighbors and instead of using such labels regard themselves as “Americans”. 
Such factors account  for the circumstance that Latinos do not compose a 
homogenous voting block. Although Latinos were viewed to overwhelmingly 
vote democratic, in the 2004 presidential election the Republican Party was able 
to increase its share of Latino votes for the third  time in a row, causing the 
Democrats to rethink their strategy of attracting Latinos. 
Yet, in all their diversity, Latinos underwent a broad transformation in the United 
States during the last decades. At the beginning of the 20
th century, Latinos in the 
United States comprised of Mexicans in the south and Puerto Ricans in the 
northeast. “[T]hrough intermarriage, through shared knowledge of one another’s 
music, food, and traditions, through common language, through a common 
experience of combating anti-Hispanic prejudice and being shunted into the same 
de facto segregated neighborhoods”
228, Latinos converged culturally as well as 
politically.  
A bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in December 2005 that would 
increase security at the border while m aking it a felony for an illegal immigrant to 
be in the country or to aid one caused large demonstrations. Beginning in April 
2006, protests reached a climax on May 1
st   when several million immigrants 
marched against the bill throughout the country. Under the banner “Day without 
an Immigrant” they intended to show America’s need for low skilled manpower. 
“While the boycott, an idea born several months ago among a small group of 
grassroots immigration advocates […], may not have shut down the country, it 
was strongly felt in a variety of places, particularly those with large Latino 
populations.”
229  
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The protesters were mainly Latino, coming from all national-origin groups 
residing in the U.S. The issue of immigration and its consequences is of central 
concern  to Latinos regardless of origin, showing signs of convergence despite 
numerous differences. In this context the concept of pan-ethnicity
230 receives 
increasing importance in consideration of unified acts to counter anti-immigration 
legislature. On the grounds of common experiences as immigrants and a Spanish-
speaking minority, Latinos need to act cohesively to enhance their impact on U.S. 
politics. As recent demonstrations have shown, the maximum number of 
protesters is decisive in order to attract public awareness.  
However, it is necessary to outline the multi-ethnic character of the protest, where 
African and Asian Americans accompanied Latinos, albeit in far smaller numbers. 
Immigration is not an explicit Latino issue, yet, it may serve as a trigger for 
further corporate steps. Despite all differences, Latino politicians, entrepreneurs, 
and professionals have a marked interest in an unified Latino population. 
Politicians may hope for a broader base to receive their votes from. Benefits for 
entrepreneurs and professionals would be a bigger market to distribute products, 
which would add new jobs to the Latino community.
231 
Acting as a unified entity would definitely offer new opportunities to Latinos, not 
only politically. Being larger than all but the eleven richest countries in the world, 
the Latino market in the United States indicates potential for economic influence, 
which inevitably may have an impact on U.S. politics towards its biggest 
minority.
232 Already now, two TV stations, produced in the United States but 
broadcasting exclusively in Spanish, and several dozen Spanish newspapers are 
serving the Latino market. The Latin Grammy Awards are held annually, paying 
tribute to the fast growing Spanish-language music market in the United States.  
 
Despite critics of comprehensive and fast immigration to the United States, 
Latinos do not aspire to build a parallel society. Comparable to German, Irish, and 
Italian immigrants arriving in the beginning of the 20
th century, Latinos seek to 
preserve parts of their traditions and culture in their new environment. Their 
unique feature is that immigrants from over twenty countries share one single 
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language. But as surveys show, second and third generation Latinos are 
predominantly English speaking. They hope to climb the s ocial ladder in order to 
improve life circumstances of themselves and their families in their home 
countries. To do so a political voice is essential.  
The cases of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans have shown that it is a long struggle for 
equal opportunities and political influence and that possibilities as well as 
measures may differ. Among Latinos, the Cuban experience is rather unique 
attributed to international circumstances. In consideration of histories, legal 
opportunities, and actions the Latino population in the United States is a 
heterogeneous part of society subsumed under one label. Regarding the future, 
however, it seems of fundamental necessity to act in a more or less unified way.  
Due to their growing numbers, Latinos will enlarge their impact on  U.S. politics 
both on national as well as on international issues. 
Internationally, Latinos are predominantly concerned with correlations between 
the United States and Latin America. In the past, they already actively or 
passively influenced several events. The Elián González affair was accompanied 
by heavy political lobbying of Cuban Americans in Florida, forcing the U.S. 
government to act. Ongoing immigration from Mexico to the United States and 
lobbying by Latino interest groups forced George W. Bush and the Mexican 
President Vincente Fox to push for legislation in order to regularize this stream.  
Nationally, topics such as immigration, social security, and education were named 
top priorities by Latinos and will be influenced by them in the future.
233 In v iew 
of  the aging of Anglos and the relative youthfulness of Latinos social security 
programs will increasingly depend on the latter. Due to ascending numbers of 
Latinos, who become naturalized, issues of their concern will be promoted  
politically. The ethnic and socioeconomic diversity may be disadvantageous but is 
unlikely to prevent them to play an even stronger role in influencing electoral 
outcomes as they already do. When managing to act cohesively, despite all 
differences, Latino influence on United States politics will increase making the 
country’s largest minority an even stronger political and societal entity.  
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10. Zusammenfassung in Deutsch 
 
Die Begriffe  Latino und  Hispanic dienen der Vereinheitlichung und 
Vereinfachung der numerisch größten Minorität in den USA.  Aufgrund der 
Heterogenität dieser Bevölkerungsgruppe sind beide Begriffe unzureichend, 
werden jedoch sowohl in der Fachliteratur, als auch von offiziellen Stellen 
gebraucht. Beide Begriffe stehen für die aus über zwanzig Ländern 
Lateinamerikas stammende spanisch-sprechende Minderheit in den USA und 
werden in der vorliegenden Arbeit abwechselnd gebraucht.   
These der Arbeit ist, dass man weder von den Latinos als einer homogenen 
Einheit, noch einer geeinten politischen Strategie dieser G ruppe sprechen kann. 
Da Latinos seit 2003 mit etwa 41.3 Millionen Menschen die größte Minderheit in 
den USA sind und ihre Zahl auch in Zukunft schnell wachsen wird, nimmt ihr 
Einfluss auf die Gesellschaft im Allgemeinen und die Politik im Besonderen zu. 
Spanischsprachige Fernsehkanäle und Radiostationen, sowie Zeitungen und 
Zeitschriften gehören längst zum Alltag der USA und stehen für eine wachsende 
„Hispanisierung“ des Landes. 
 
Im ersten Teil der Arbeit wird ein Überblick gegeben, der die demographischen 
und wirtschaftlichen Besonderheiten der Latinos im Allgemeinen beleuchtet. 
Diese Bevölkerungsgruppe ist im Vergleich zu weißen Anglo Amerikanern 
durchschnittlich ärmer und verfügt über niedrigere Bildungsstandards. Dies wirkt 
sich auf die ausgeübten Berufe und somit auf das Einkommen aus. Latinos sind 
im Durchschnitt jünger als jede andere Bevölkerungsgruppe in den USA, was die 
zukünftige Zusammensetzung der amerikanischen Gesellschaft beeinflussen wird. 
 
Die hohe Anzahl nicht eingebürgerter Latinos, die entweder illegal oder zeitlich 
befristet in den USA leben, beeinflussen ebenso die Teilnahme im politischen 
System, wie die vom Gesetzgeber vorgegebenen Beschränkungen. Da die 
Teilnahme an Wahlen die U.S.-amerikanische Staatsbürgerschaft voraussetzt, ist 
es  im Falle der Latinos zweckdienlich auch andere Möglichkeiten politischer 
Aktivitäten zu erwähnen. In diesem Zusammenhang sind Bürgerrechts- und 
Interessengruppen von grundlegender Bedeutung, da sie für viele Latinos die erste 
Möglichkeit bieten sich politisch Gehör zu verschaffen. Zudem arbeiten diese                                                                                                                  
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Gruppen intensiv im Bereich der politischen Aufklärung und Bildung, und helfen 
bei Einbürgerungsanträgen.  
Durch die Vielzahl an Herkunftsländern und der damit einhergehenden 
Heterogenität der Latinos sind politische Absichten, sowie die Partizipation am 
politischen Prozess in den USA, jedoch äußerst unterschiedlich. Die drei größten 
Nationalitäten  – Mexikaner, Kubaner, Puerto Ricaner  – dienen hierbei als Beleg 
für diese These. Alle drei Gruppen werden vor dem  Hintergrund ihrer 
spezifischen historischen Erfahrungen untersucht. Um politische Aktivitäten und 
Möglichkeiten der jeweiligen Nationalitäten zu verstehen, ist es fundamental, die 
historischen Beziehungen der jeweiligen Länder zu den USA zu beleuchten . 
 
Die Mexikaner bilden mit etwa zwei dritteln der gesamten Latino Bevölkerung 
die mit Abstand größte Ethnie innerhalb dieser Minorität. Mexiko Amerikaner 
können auf eine lange politische Tradition in den USA zurückblicken, die ihren 
Ursprung im Mexikanisch-Amerikanischen Krieg von 1846 hat. Seitdem waren 
Mexikaner vor allem in Basisorganisationen wie etwa Bürgerrechtsbewegungen 
und Gewerkschaften tätig. Nach Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges forderten 
Mexikaner zunehmend energisch ihre Bürgerrechte ein und gewannen auch durch 
ihre bloße Anzahl an Einfluss. Seit Mitte der 1980er Jahre besetzen sie 
zunehmend wichtige politische Ämter, etwa als Abgeordnete im Kongress. 
 
Die Kubaner bilden mit etwas mehr als einer Million Menschen die drittgrößte 
Gruppe der Latinos. Sie immigrierten hauptsächlich nach der Machtergreifung 
Fidel Castros 1959 in die USA und leben fast ausschließlich in Florida. Da die 
meisten Kubaner aus politischen Motiven emigrierten, gilt ihr Hauptaugenmerk 
dem Sturz Castros. Durch ihre große Anzahl in Florida und sich überschneidender 
politischer Interessen mit einem Großteil der republikanischen Partei gelang es 
ihnen schnell, Einfluss auf die US-Außenpolitik zu nehmen. Mehr als jede andere 
Ethnie der Latinos verfügen Kubaner über beste Beziehungen in d ie höchsten 
politischen Kreise und nehmen in weitaus größerem Maße an Wahlen teil als 
andere Latinos. 
 
Die dritte untersuchte Gruppe, die Puerto Ricaner, unterscheidet sich in einem 
wesentlichen Punkt von allen anderen Gruppen der Latinos: als einzige besitzen                                                                                                                  
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sie von Geburt an die US-amerikanische Staatsbürgerschaft und verfügen somit 
über weitaus größere rechtliche und politische Möglichkeiten. Als Bewohner der 
Insel dürfen sie zwar nicht an den Präsidentschaftswahlen teilnehmen, sobald sie 
allerdings ihren Wohnsitz auf das Festland verlegen, sind sie rechtlich 
vollkommen gleichgestellt. Viele Puerto Ricaner nutzen diesen Vorteil, um 
flexibel zwischen Insel und Festland zu pendeln. Als „freier assoziierter Staat“ 
wird Puerto Rico offiziell geführt, von Kritikern als letzte Kolonie weltweit 
bezeichnet. Das politische Engagement der Puerto Ricaner ist stark von dieser 
Abhängigkeit geprägt. Zwar gibt es immer wieder Bestrebungen, die 
vollkommene Unabhängigkeit zu erlangen, doch sehen auch viele die Vorteile der 
US-amerikanischen Staatsbürgerschaft, die sie nicht aufgeben wollen.   
 
Trotz dieser ausgeprägten Heterogenität unter den Latinos, birgt eine 
Vereinheitlichung, wie sie mit den Begriffen Latino und Hispanic gewollt ist, 
auch neue Möglichkeiten und Vorteile. Als numerisch starker, politischer Akteur 
können Latinos in Zukunft erheblichen Einfluss auf die Politik des Landes 
ausüben, vorausgesetzt sie finden einen gemeinsamen Nenner. Demographen 
gehen davon aus, dass im Jahre 2050 jeder zweite US-Bürger als L atino zu 
bezeichnen ist, weshalb die beiden großen Parteien vor einigen Jahren damit 
begannen, diese Bevölkerungsgruppe zu umwerben. Aller Diversität zum Trotz 
gehen einige politische Analysten, sowie Demoskopen, weiterhin von einem 
homogenen  Akteur aus.  Tatsächlich betrachten viele Latinos aller Ethnien 
Themen wie Immigration, Sozialversicherung, oder auch Bildung als wichtige 
Probleme, die es zu lösen gilt. 
Sollten die Latinos in den USA, trotz ihrer Vielschichtigkeit, einheitliche 
Interessen definieren  und diese gemeinsam verfolgen, wird die größte Minderheit 
zu einem noch wichtigeren politischen Akteur, der seinen Einfluss, sowohl auf 
nationale wie auch internationale Themen, geltend machen wird.  
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